Category Archives: Uncategorized

Unexpected source of Fukushima-derived radiocesium to the coastal ocean of Japan, August 2017.

August 28, 2017 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA. http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/09/26/1708659114 “Five years after the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, the highest radiocesium (137Cs) activities outside of the power plant site were observed in brackish groundwater underneath sand beaches. We hypothesize that the radiocesium was deposited on mineral surfaces in the days and weeks after the accident through wave- and tide-driven exchange of seawater through the beach face. As seawater radiocesium concentrations decreased, this radiocesium reentered the ocean via submarine groundwater discharge, at a rate on par with direct discharge from the power plant and river runoff. This new unanticipated pathway for the storage and release of radionuclides to ocean should be taken into account in the management of coastal areas where nuclear power plants are situated.” “Abstract
There are 440 operational nuclear reactors in the world, with approximately one-half situated along the coastline. This includes the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP), which experienced multiple reactor meltdowns in March 2011 followed by the release of radioactivity to the marine environment. While surface inputs to the ocean via atmospheric deposition and rivers are usually well monitored after a nuclear accident, no study has focused on subterranean pathways. During our study period, we found the highest cesium-137 (137Cs) levels (up to 23,000 Bq⋅m−3) outside of the FDNPP site not in the ocean, rivers, or potable groundwater, but in groundwater beneath sand beaches over tens of kilometers away from the FDNPP. Here, we present evidence of a previously unknown, ongoing source of Fukushima-derived 137Cs to the coastal ocean. We postulate that these beach sands were contaminated in 2011 through wave- and tide-driven exchange and sorption of highly radioactive Cs from seawater. Subsequent desorption of 137Cs and fluid exchange from the beach sands was quantified using naturally occurring radium isotopes. This estimated ocean 137Cs source (0.6 TBq⋅y−1) is of similar magnitude as the ongoing releases of 137Cs from the FDNPP site for 2013–2016, as well as the input of Fukushima-derived dissolved 137Cs via rivers. Although this ongoing source is not at present a public health issue for Japan, the release of Cs of this type and scale needs to be considered in nuclear power plant monitoring and scenarios involving future accidents.” end quote August 28, 2017 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA.   Authors: 

  1. Virginie Saniala,1,
  2. Ken O. Buesselera,1,
  3. Matthew A. Charettea, and
  4. Seiya Nagaob
  1. Edited by David M. Karl, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI, and approved August 28, 2017 (received for review May 24, 2017)

Advertisements

IAEA Report on Fukushima Diiachi

For proof of existing technical foresight regarding the accident and failure paths at Fukushima Diiachi, please read  “The Menace of Atomic Energy” by Nader and Abbott, Outback Press, Victoria, Australia. Copyright 1977. ISBN 0 86888 0515. Also please see https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/the-eccs-controversey-of-the-1960s-and-1970s-usa-in-the-light-of-march-2011/

 

THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL IAEA INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY GC(59)/14
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1710-ReportByTheDG-Web.pdf

Extracted quotations.
“A major factor that contributed to the accident was the widespread assumption in Japan that its nuclear power plants were so safe that an accident of this magnitude was simply unthinkable. This assumption was accepted by nuclear power plant operators and was not challenged by regulators or by the Government. As a result, Japan was not sufficiently prepared for a severe nuclear accident in March 2011. The Fukushima Daiichi accident exposed certain weaknesses in Japan’s regulatory framework. Responsibilities were divided among a number of bodies, and it was not always clear where authority lay.
There were also certain weaknesses in plant design, in emergency preparedness and response arrangements and in planning for the management of a severe accident. There was an assumption that there would never be a loss of all electrical power at a nuclear power plant for more than a short period. The possibility of several reactors at the same facility suffering a crisis at the same time was not considered. And insufficient provision was made for the possibility of a nuclear accident occurring at the same time as a major natural disaster….. “
“At the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the earthquake caused damage to the electric power supply lines to the site, and the tsunami caused substantial destruction of the operational and safety infrastructure on the site. The combined effect led to the loss of off-site and on-site electrical power. This resulted in the loss of the cooling function at the three operating reactor units2 as well as at the spent fuel pools. The four other nuclear power plants3 along the coast were also affected to different degrees by the earthquake and tsunami. However, all operating reactor units at these plants were safely shut down.
Despite the efforts of the operators at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to maintain control, the reactor cores in Units 1–3 overheated, the nuclear fuel melted and the three containment vessels were breached. Hydrogen was released from the reactor pressure vessels, leading to explosions inside the reactor buildings in Units 1, 3 and 4 that damaged structures and equipment and injured personnel. Radionuclides were released from the plant to the atmosphere and were deposited on land and on the ocean. There were also direct releases into the sea.
People within a radius of 20 km of the site and in other designated areas were evacuated, and those within a radius of 20–30 km were instructed to shelter before later being advised to voluntarily evacuate. Restrictions were placed on the distribution and consumption of food and the consumption of drinking water. At the time of writing, many people were still living outside the areas from which they were evacuated….. “
“Prior to the earthquake, the Japan Trench was categorized as a subduction zone with a frequent occurrence of magnitude 8 class earthquakes; an earthquake of magnitude 9.0 off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture was not considered to be credible by Japanese scientists. However, similar or higher magnitudes had been registered in different areas in similar tectonic environments in the past few decades.
There were no indications that the main safety features of the plant were affected by the vibratory ground motions generated by the earthquake on 11 March 2011. This was due to the conservative approach to earthquake design and construction of nuclear power plants in Japan, resulting in a plant
3
that was provided with sufficient safety margins. However, the original design considerations did not provide comparable safety margins for extreme external flooding events, such as tsunamis. …”
“The design of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant provided equipment and systems for the first three levels of defence in depth: (1) equipment intended to provide reliable normal operation; (2) equipment intended to return the plant to a safe state after an abnormal event; and (3) safety systems intended to manage accident conditions. The design bases were derived using a range of postulated hazards; however, external hazards such as tsunamis were not fully addressed. Consequently, the flooding resulting from the tsunami simultaneously challenged the first three protective levels of defence in depth, resulting in common cause failures of equipment and systems at each of the three levels. ..
The common cause failures of multiple safety systems resulted in plant conditions that were not envisaged in the design. Consequently, the means of protection intended to provide the fourth level of defence in depth, that is, prevention of the progression of severe accidents and mitigation of their consequences, were not available to restore the reactor cooling and to maintain the integrity of the containment. The complete loss of power, the lack of information on relevant safety parameters due to the unavailability of the necessary instruments, the loss of control devices and the insufficiency of operating procedures made it impossible to arrest the progression of the accident and to limit its consequences.
The failure to provide sufficient means of protection at each level of defence in depth resulted in severe reactor damage in Units 1, 2 and 3 and in significant radioactive releases from these units. “
“The operators were not fully prepared for the multi-unit loss of power and the loss of cooling caused by the tsunami. Although TEPCO had developed severe accident management guidelines, they did not cover this unlikely combination of events. Operators had therefore not received appropriate training and had not taken part in relevant severe accident exercises, and the equipment available to them was not adequate in the degraded plant conditions.”
“At the time of the accident, separate arrangements were in place to respond to nuclear emergencies and natural disasters at the national and local levels. There were no coordinated arrangements for responding to a nuclear emergency and a natural disaster occurring simultaneously. “
“The consequences of the earthquake and tsunami, and increased radiation levels, made the on-site response extremely difficult. The loss of AC and DC electrical power, the presence of a huge amount of rubble that hindered on-site response measures, aftershocks, alerts of further tsunamis and increased radiation levels meant that many mitigatory actions could not be carried out in a timely manner. The national Government was involved in decisions concerning mitigatory action on the site.
The activation of the emergency Off-site Centre, located 5 km from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, was difficult because of extensive infrastructure damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami. Within a few days, it became necessary to evacuate the Off-site Centre due to adverse radiological conditions. “
“National emergency arrangements at the time of the accident envisaged that decisions on protective actions would be based on estimates of the projected dose to the public that would be calculated when a decision was necessary, using a dose projection model — the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI). The arrangements did not envisage that
8
decisions on urgent protective actions for the public would be based on predefined specific plant conditions. However, in response to the accident, the initial decisions on protective actions were made on the basis of plant conditions. Estimates of the source term could not be provided as an input to SPEEDI owing to the loss of on-site power. “

“The evacuation of people from the vicinity of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant began in the evening of 11 March 2011, with the evacuation zone gradually extended from a radius of 2 km of the plant to 3 km and then to 10 km. By the evening of 12 March, it had been extended to 20 km. Similarly, the area in which people were ordered to shelter was extended from within 3–10 km of the plant shortly after the accident to within 20–30 km by 15 March. In the area within a 20–30 km radius of the nuclear power plant, the public was ordered to shelter until 25 March, when the national Government recommended voluntary evacuation. Administration of stable iodine for iodine thyroid blocking was not implemented uniformly, primarily due to the lack of detailed arrangements.
There were difficulties in evacuation due to the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami and the resulting communication and transportation problems. There were also significant difficulties encountered when evacuating patients from hospitals and nursing homes within the 20 km evacuation zone.
On 22 April, the existing 20 km evacuation zone was established as a ‘Restricted Area’, with controlled re-entry. A ‘Deliberate Evacuation Area’ was also established beyond the ‘Restricted Area’ in locations where the specific dose criteria for relocation might be exceeded.
Once radionuclides were detected in the environment, arrangements were made regarding protective actions in the agricultural area and restrictions on the consumption and distribution of food and consumption of drinking water. In addition, a certification system for food and other products intended for export was established.
Several channels were used to keep the public informed and to respond to people’s concerns during the emergency, including television, radio, the Internet and telephone hotlines. Feedback from the public received via hotlines and counselling services identified the need for easily understandable information and supporting material. “
“The accident resulted in the release of radionuclides to the environment. Assessments of the releases have been performed by many organizations using different models. Most of the atmospheric releases were blown eastward by the prevailing winds, depositing onto and dispersing within the North Pacific Ocean. Uncertainties in estimations of the amount and composition of the radioactive substances were difficult to resolve for reasons that included the lack of monitored data on the deposition of the atmospheric releases on the ocean.
Changes in the wind direction meant that a relatively small part of the atmospheric releases were deposited on land, mostly in a north-westerly direction from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The presence and activity of radionuclides deposited in the terrestrial environment were monitored and characterized. The measured activity of radionuclides decreases over time due to physical decay, environmental transport processes and cleanup activities.
In addition to radionuclides entering the ocean from the atmospheric deposition, there were liquid releases and discharges from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant directly into the sea at the site. The precise movement of radionuclides in the ocean is difficult to assess by measurements alone, but a number of oceanic transport models have been used to estimate the oceanic dispersion.
Radionuclides such as iodine-131, caesium-134 and caesium-137 were released and found in drinking water, food and some non-edible items. Restrictions to prevent the consumption of these products were established by the Japanese authorities in response to the accident.”
“Following the accident, the Japanese authorities applied conservative reference levels of dose included in the recent ICRP recommendations9. The application of some of the protective measures and actions proved to be difficult for the implementing authorities and very demanding for the people affected.
There were some differences between the national and international criteria and guidance for controlling drinking water, food and non-edible consumer products in the longer term aftermath of the accident, once the emergency phase had passed. “
“ . In the short term, the most significant contributors to the exposure of the public were: (1) external exposure from radionuclides in the plume and deposited on the ground; and (2) internal exposure of the thyroid gland, due to the intake of iodine-131, and internal exposure of other organs and tissues, mainly due to the intake of caesium-134 and caesium-137. In the long term, the most important contributor to the exposure of the public will be external radiation from the deposited caesium-137. 
The early assessments of radiation doses used environmental monitoring and dose estimation models, resulting in some overestimations. For the estimates in this report, personal monitoring data provided by the local authorities were also included to provide more robust information on the actual individual doses incurred and their distribution. These estimates indicate that the effective doses incurred by members of the public were low and generally comparable with the range of effective doses incurred due to global levels of natural background radiation. 
In the aftermath of a nuclear accident involving releases of iodine-131 and its intake by children, the uptake and subsequent doses to their thyroid glands are a particular concern. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the reported thyroid equivalent doses of children were low because their intake of iodine-131 was limited, partly due to restrictions placed on drinking water and food, including leafy vegetables and fresh milk. There are uncertainties concerning the iodine intakes immediately following the accident due to the scarcity of reliable personal radiation monitoring data for this period.
By December 2011, around 23 000 emergency workers had been involved in the emergency operations. The effective doses incurred by most of them were below the occupational dose limits in Japan. Of this number, 174 exceeded the original criterion for emergency workers and 6 emergency workers exceeded the temporarily revised effective dose criterion in an emergency established by the Japanese authority. Some shortcomings occurred in the implementation of occupational radiation protection requirements, including during the early monitoring and recording of radiation doses of emergency workers, in the availability and use of some protective equipment and in associated training. “
“ . No early radiation induced health effects were observed among workers or members of the public that could be attributed to the accident. 
The latency time for late radiation health effects can be decades, and therefore it is not possible to discount the potential occurrence of such effects among an exposed population by observations a few years after exposure. However, given the low levels of doses reported among members of the public, the conclusions of this report are in agreement with those of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) to the United Nations General Assembly.10 UNSCEAR found that “no discernible increased incidence of radiation-related health effects are expected among exposed members of the public and their descendants” (which was reported within the context of the health implications related to “levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami”).11 Among the group of workers who received effective doses of 100 mSv or more, UNSCEAR concluded that “an increased risk of cancer would be expected in the future. However, any increased incidence of cancer in this group is expected to be indiscernible because of the difficulty of confirming such a small incidence against the normal statistical fluctuations in cancer incidence.”12 “

“The long term goal of post-accident recovery16 is to re-establish an acceptable basis for a fully functioning society in the affected areas. Consideration needs to be given to remediation17 of the areas affected by the accident in order to reduce radiation doses, consistent with adopted reference levels. In preparing for the return of evacuees, factors such as the restoration of infrastructure and the viability and sustainable economic activity of the community need to be considered. “
“Japanese authorities have estimated that the timescale for completing decommissioning activities is likely to be in the range of 30–40 years. Decisions regarding the final conditions of the plant and site will be the subject of further analysis and discussions. “
“Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there were difficulties in establishing locations to store the large amounts of contaminated material arising from off-site remediation activities. At the time of writing, several hundred temporary storage facilities had been established in local communities and efforts to establish an interim storage facility were continuing. “

“The nuclear accident and radiation protection measures introduced in both the emergency and post- accident recovery phases have had significant consequences for the way of life of the affected population. Evacuation and relocation measures and restrictions on food involved hardships for the people affected. The revitalization and reconstruction projects introduced in Fukushima Prefecture were developed from an understanding of the socioeconomic consequences of the accident. These projects address issues such as reconstruction of infrastructure, community revitalization and support and compensation.
Communication with the public on recovery activities is essential to build trust. ….”

End quotes.

NHK Japan Special Fukushima – Radioactive Forest via Japan Focus, Cornell University USA.

Japan Focus: ”
Radioactive Forest, Radioactive Wild Life:
Fukushima and the Lessons of Chernobyl

We are providing a special bonus for Asia-Pacific Journal subscribers.

The following NHK Documentary provides a riveting visual perspective on the transformation of the Fukushima region, 230 kilometers North of Tokyo in the wake of the 3.11 triple disaster. Earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant laid waste to the region which remains a wasteland to this day.

Wild animals are roaming the streets in a town evacuated since the Fukushima natural disaster. They seem intent on taking over the disaster community.

Are the flora and fauna in the forests suffering radioactive contamination? The film does not offer conclusive evidence, but it provides graphic presentation of the massive and continuing disaster facing Fukushima in light of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

Forests remain contaminated by radioactive particles. Wildlife including wild boars and raccoons run rampant through the waste abandoned following evacuation of humans. Radiation doses show continued high levels of contamination.

Many questions remain about the long-term impact of the disaster. In particular, the documentary finds that scientists can’t (or can’t yet) conclude that radiation is the cause of abnormalities in Fukushima, or what the effects will be on future generations.

But they document graphically, with abundant scientific and technological evidence, the nature of the impact on land, wildlife, humans and society, and the immense and ever increasing financial costs of government efforts to respond. end quote. Source: Japan Focus Newsletter, Cornell University, USA, 31 December 2016.

A Dissociated State: The Exclusion of Aboriginal People by South Australian Authorities

An Australian government document described the exclusion of Aboriginal Australians and Nuclear Test Participants from official health considerations are follows:
“Two population groups are excluded from the (Exposure Dose) calculations. They are the Aboriginals living away from population centres and the personnel involved directly in nuclear test activities. Otherwise, the total population is represented in the estimated radiation doses.” [1]
In other words, those most affected were excluded.

The Howard government originally promised to include Aboriginal people and
Pastoralists in the nuclear test health study announced in 1999. The responsible minister,Bruce Scott, MP, stated: “I have announced the compilation of a nominal roll of exservice personnel involved in the testing and also civilians, aborigines and pastoralists, for whom information is available. This nominal roll will be used to conduct mortality and cancer incidence studies of Australians involved in the UK nuclear tests. This will
enable the Government to determine if current compensation and assessment
arrangements are sufficient.” [2]

In March 2006 the then responsible minister, Mr Bruce Billson, MP, emailed me as
follows: “Indigenous Australians were excluded from the study because there is no available list of Indigenous Australians who were present in the areas of the tests at the time. In the 1950s and 1960s the indigenous population was not counted in the census and there were no records kept of Indigenous Australians who lived in the test areas.” [3]

This exclusive act is abhorrent and disgusting. The authorities did not want to know in the 1950s. And today Ministers of the Crown justify an exclusion from study on the grounds of lack of knowledge. Rather, admitted ignorance is a call to study to any enlightened mind.
So again, the obvious signs of external contact with Beta emitters – residual Beta radiation burn damage – has been ignored, along with the incipient internal dose, as recently as 2006.
The beta burns carried by Australians date from 1952 to 1957. Every official instrument created to examine the impact of the atomic tests has failed to admit the evidence these beta burns present. For they represent both as proof of suffering and as technical biological markers of external dose received. The skin lesions can be read as a form of dose marker from which actual external dose can be determined. [4]

What did the Australian Government find and conclude about the state of health of those who were included in the health survey?

In regard to Australia’s Nuclear Veterans, the “Mortality and Cancer
Incidence Main Findings” document of the “Australian Participants in British
Nuclear Tests in Australia Study”, Department of Veterans Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, June 2006, states the following:

“The cancer incidence study showed an overall increase in the number of
cancers in test participants, similar to that found in the mortality study. The
number of cancer cases found among participants was 2456, which was 23%
higher than expected. A significant increase in both the number of deaths and
the number of cases was found for (figures in brackets show increase in
mortality and incidence):
• all cancers (18% and 23%)
• cancers of the lip, oral cavity and pharynx (50% and 41%)
• lung cancer (20% and 28%)
• colorectal cancer (24% and 16%)
prostate • cancer (26% and 22%).
The number of cancer cases (but not the number of deaths) was also
significantly greater in test participants for the following cancers (figures in
brackets show increase in incidence):
• oesophageal cancer (48%)
• melanoma (40%)
• all leukaemias (43%)
all leukaemia’s except chronic lymphatic leukaemia (61%).
Other findings included:
• of the 26 mesothelioma cases in test participants, 16 occurred in RAN
personnel, which was nearly three times the number expected
in RAAF personnel, there was nearly double the expected number of deaths
from melanoma, and cases of melanoma were increased by two–thirds.
The increases in cancer rates do not appear to have been caused by
exposure to radiation.”

Most people can see a self serving statement when they see one.

Suspected Beta Radiation Burns in the Australian Outback
In 1953 the late Kukkika was a young girl, living in South Australia’s northern
areas. October of that year saw the first British bomb test series in South Australia take place at Emu Field, a large clay-pan in the northern part of the state.

Over a period of many years working in the northern parts of Southern Australia, Sister Michele Madigan came to know Kukkika.
Kukkika told Michele that one night during the time of the bombs, she had gone to sleep on the ground. The next day she woke up unwell; her skin was scarred white and painful.
Kukkika with sound reason believed that the ground upon which she and her people had camped had been contaminated by fallout from atomic bomb tests.

The photographs taken by Michele show severe de-pigmentation of Kukkika’s skin.
Kukkika suffered this disfigurement for over fifty years with no aid or acknowledgement from successive governments
I believe the suffering of Kukkika was caused by beta radiation burns. The photographs accord with those taken of people who suffered similar injuries in the Pacific as a result of US nuclear weapons tests. The US has acknowledged this. Kukkika was not the only Australian to suffer in this manner. Many people have, and do so still.

Lallie Lennon was an adult when the smoke from one of the Emu Field bombs engulfed her and her son Bruce. The tent in which her two daughters slept was also engulfed by the thick, heavy, twin coloured smoke.
Lallie and Bruce suffered sickness and painful skin. Lallie also suffered a loss of skin colour, the affected areas turning white.

The symptoms have lasted ever since. At the time her suffering first started, doctors refused to give a diagnosis.

Lallie was interviewed in the film “Backs to the Blast”, made in the 1981 by Harry Bardwell. In the film she is asked why her skin is scarred and white in the affected places. Lallie tells her story on film. [5]

Many other Australian Aboriginal people have suffered the same skin condition from the bomb smoke. People were blinded and some people died.

When I saw Harry Bardwell’s film, and saw and heard Lallie speak, I could not
understand why no-one had told her condition is called Beta Radiation Burn.
That was a little while ago now. The government says Australian Aborigines got sick because they were scared of the bomb smoke that engulfed them. Maybe. But that is a stupid answer to the questions. While did Yami go blind? Why were Kukkika and Lallie burnt white? Fear cannot do that. It takes a Special Weapon.
Lallie has spoken long and strong about all this. Lallie has written a book entitled “Maralinga Dust”. [6]
Yami Lester has also told his story in his book. [7]
Jessie Lennon wrote a book. [8]
Some people in Australia remember these things. Many others who wanted nuclear activities to expand claim that South Australia’s Aboriginal People have been given too much consideration. I have more to say on the repeated exclusion of Aboriginal People from the consideration of governments and from full participation in the life of South Australia.

Sources
Repeated Exclusion
[1] Wise, K.N., Moroney, J.R., “Public Health Impact of Fallout from British Nuclear
Weapons Tests in Australia, 1952 – 1957, Australian Radiation Laboratory,
Commonwealth of Australia, ARL/TR 105, ISSN 0 157-1400, May 1992, (reprint) pp. 2.

[2] “Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES Official Hansard, TUESDAY, 10 AUGUST 1999, THIRTY
NINTH PARLIAMENT FIRST SESSION—FOURTH PERIOD, CANBERRA”

[3] The Hon Bruce Billson MP, Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, Minister Assisting the
Minister for Defence, Federal Member for Dunkley, email to Mr Paul Langley, March
2006.

[4] IAEA publication “Diagnosis and Treatment of Local Radiation Injuries, Module
XIII”. This is available at :
http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/eprmedt/Day_3/Day_3-10.pps [5]

[5] Film Title: Backs to the blast [videorecording] : an Australian nuclear story /
production and direction, Harry Bardwell. Other Creators: Bardwell, Harry. Published:
Adelaide : Composite Films [for] Australian Film Commission, Creative Development
Branch, c1981. Physical Description: 1 videocassette (VHS) (50 min.) : sd., col. ; 1/2 in.
Subjects Uranium mines and mining. Uranium industry — South Australia. Radioactivewaste sites — South Australia. Nuclear weapons — South Australia — Testing. Summary:
A documentary history of the uranium and nuclear industry in South Australia from 1910 to 1980. Incorporates a mass of rare archival footage and contemporary interviews with workers, scientists and politicians, presenting an analysis of the effects of uranium and its
products. Provides a detailed examination of the uranium mine at Radium Hill, the uranium oxide refinery at Port Pirie and the British atomic weapons test site at Maralinga.
Credits: Photography, Gus Howard, Philip Bull ; film editor, Andrew Prowse ; narrator,
Martin Vaughan. Notes: Issued also as motion picture. Language: English. Dewey
Number 363.1/79/0994. Libraries Australia ID 5346898. ” National Library of Australia.

[6] Maralinga dust / Lallie Lennon
Lennon, Lallie Kantjuringa Local call number: B P957.37/W1 Principal Author: Lennon, Lallie Kantjuringa Title: Maralinga dust / Lallie Lennon Source: Women of the centre /edited by Adele Pring Apollo Bay, Vic.; Pascoe , 1990; p. 88-98; ill., map, port. Imprint:
1990 Annotation: Personal observation of effects of Maralinga testing on health of her family Collection: Print – Book Analytics Topical: Defence – Missile and weapons testing – Nuclear weapons Topical: Family Topical: Health – Gastrointestinal system Topical:
Health – Skin physiology and disease Place: Maralinga (Far West SA SH52-12) The
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Mura Library
Catalogue

[7] Lester, Yami & Institute for Aboriginal Development (Alice Springs, N.T.) 1993, Yami : the autobiography of Yami Lester, Institute for Aboriginal Development, Alice Springs
[8] Lennon, Jessie and Madigan, Michele I’m the one that know this country! (Revised ed). Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 2011.

Letter seeking Radiological Monitoring Data to Minister Ian Hunter

Hon. Ian Hunter, MLC
Minister for Sustainability, Environment and Conservation
Minister for Water and the River Murray
Minister for Climate Change

GPO Box 1047
Adelaide SA 5001

Minister Hunter,

I continue to seek the radiological monitoring data for South Australian drinking water storages for the period 1956 to 1963.

Previous requests for this information have resulted in the following State Government and agency reply documents as follows:

Letter 08/127/255, 3.2.1995, Jill Fitch, Radiation Protection Branch, South Australian Health Commission.

Letter MFI00876, 1/11/95, David Abbott, Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Mr John Olsen, Minister for Industry, Manufacturing, Small Business & Regional Development, Minister for Infrastructure.

Letter MFI, 100876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive with enclosures: Data sheets of radiological monitoring of SA Water storages.

Letter MFB 1195, BCN/AK15, 19/5/96, The Hon. John Olsen, FNIA, MP

Letter MFI 00876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive.

All of the preceeding documents conveyed that the information I sought did not exist.

I refer also to the following documents addressed to me by the then Minister for Environment and Conservation, Mr. John Hill:

03EC2212 dated 11 June 2003
03EC2951 dated 19 June 2003

Copies of these two letters are attached as enclosures herewith.

On 11 June 2003 Minister Hill advised me that in relation to my request for this information that:

“Your letter refers to a Freedom of Information application lodged by Dr Cross in January 2002. You should note that this application was submitted before the election of a Labor Government in South Australia in March 2002. At that time, the secrecy provisions of the Act prevented the release of the information requested by Dr. Cross. …..This government was elected to office with a commitment to do whatever is reasonable and appropriate to ensure there are no impediments to the public availability of information……” The then Minister then confirmed the election promise to specifically to change the “secrecy” provisions of section 19 of the Radiation Protection and Control Act, 1982.
This was done, the Minister informed me, on 5 December 2002.

I note that the State Government’s formal documents addressed to Dr Cross regarding the rejection of the Cross FOI Application and the of the rejection of the subsequent appeal both confirm that the documents do indeed exist.

This is in stark contrast to the State government documents addressed to me dated 3.2.1995, 1.11.1995, 19.5.1996 all advise me via Fitch, Abbott and Olsen that the documents I sought and still seek did not exist. In this regard Mr Olsen SA Water to supply me with documents for a later period which did and do exist. Letters Letter MFI, 100876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive (with enclosures: Data sheets of radiological monitoring of SA Water storages from 1964 to 1995), and Letter MFI 00876, SA Water Corp 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive confirm that with the supply of the documents covering the data from 1964 I now had all documents which exist. As helpful as the documents are to me, these documents had previously been supplied to Dr. Helen Caldicott during the period of the 1970s. She did not have an easy time obtaining the documents, as I recall from listening Bazz and Pilko on breakfast radio at the time. I have no association with Dr. Caldicott just in case that helps my case in any way.

I refer also to the letter to me from then Minister Hill dated 19 June 2003. In this letter the State labor Government advises me that “Your matter is receiving attention and a response will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.” The letter is signed by Carolyne Lee, Office Manager for the Minister for Environment and Conservation.

How much longer will the State Government be in providing me with an answer to my requests? Can I see the documents which record the readings from the radiological monitoring of SA drinking water storages fom 1956 until 1963?

I point out that the documents began to exist from 1956. They still exist. The alleged will of the government is to possess a spirit of openness and democracy in regards to the information it holds in trust for the people in South Australia. I have yet to see any evidence of this spirit of openness in this matter.

I would appreciate action in this matter. I have been quite patient in this matter. I know how slowly the wheels of government move. As all South Australians do. I beg therefore, in the old fashioned some sign that the state can handle the truth in a spirit of openness worthy of a body which purports to represent the will of the people, and which was elected on the basis of that promise of openness and democracy.

I note today the Citizens’ Jury 2, formed by the Premier of South Australia to consider specific matters has delivered its verdict to the State Government and people of South Australia. I note the reaction of the nuclear industry and experts to that verdict. I note that lack of trust in government is a major stumbling block in the view of the People’s Jury. The findings of the citizens’ jury present no difficulty when compared to my experience in obtaining the information I have sought since I was a young in the 1990s. I am now quite. It is 2016.

I find it highly lamentable and deplorable that the State Government has expressed views which convey the judgement that the people of South Australia are ill informed on matters of nuclear undertakings and the effects of them.

That such judgements are passed by politicians who have, from the 1950s until the present day, repeatedly refused to be open and honest with the people of SA. And who, it seems to me, have the goal of keeping the people of this state of Australia in a goldfish bowl of the very ignorance we are accused of.
If is also interesting to note that an alleged ignoramus like me is told documents do not exist, whereas a Doctor of science, such as Dr. Cross, is told that he cannot see the documents because they do, in fact exist. This information is in the public interest. Why are the people of the State being denied access to it?

Yours Sincerely,

Paul Langley

Radilogical Safety NCO,
Storeman, technical clerk,
RADIAC Centre,
RAEME, Australian Army
Retired.

I ask the readers of my blog to consider writing to Minister Hunt asking for the Radiological Monitoring Data for South Australian Drinking Water Storages for the period 1956 to 1963. If English is not your first language, please write to the Minister in your first language. I ask also that you consider writing to the Minister via snail mail and not emailing the Minister. I ask most firmly that your letters, if you decide to write one, remain formal and polite. Irony is encouraged. Mention of the Dead Parrot Routine would probably be frowned upon by authorities, as perfect a fit as it is.

Thank you for your help.

How Does the SA Government Handle the Nuclear Truth?

Hon. Ian Hunter, MLC
Minister for Sustainability, Environment and Conservation
Minister for Water and the River Murray
Minister for Climate Change
GPO Box 1047
Adelaide SA 5001

8 NOV 2016

Minister Hunter,

I continue to seek the radiological monitoring data for South Australian drinking water storages for the period 1956 to 1963.

Previous requests for this information have resulted in the following State Government and agency reply documents as follows:
Letter 08/127/255, 3.2.1995, Jill Fitch, Radiation Protection Branch, South Australian Health Commission.

Letter MFI00876, 1/11/95, David Abbott, Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Mr John Olsen, Minister for Industry, Manufacturing, Small Business & Regional Development, Minister for Infrastructure.

Letter MFI, 100876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive with enclosures: Data sheets of radiological monitoring of SA Water storages.

Letter MFB 1195, BCN/AK15, 19/5/96, The Hon. John Olsen, FNIA, MP

Letter MFI 00876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive.

All of the preceding documents conveyed that the information I sought did not exist.
I refer also to the following documents addressed to me by the then Minister for Environment and Conservation, Mr. John Hill:

03EC2212 dated 11 June 2003

03EC2951 dated 19 June 2003

On 11 June 2003 Minister Hill advised me that in relation to my request for this information that:
“Your letter refers to a Freedom of Information application lodged by Dr Cross in January 2002. You should note that this application was submitted before the election of a Labor Government in South Australia in March 2002. At that time, the secrecy provisions of the Act prevented the release of the information requested by Dr. Cross. …..This government was elected to office with a commitment to do whatever is reasonable and appropriate to ensure there are no impediments to the public availability of information……” The then Minister then confirmed the election promise to specifically to change the “secrecy” provisions of section 19 of the Radiation Protection and Control Act, 1982.
This was done, the Minister informed me, on 5 December 2002.

I note that the State Government’s formal documents addressed to Dr Cross regarding the rejection of the Cross FOI Application and the of the rejection of the subsequent appeal both confirm that the documents do indeed exist.

This is in stark contrast to the State government documents addressed to me dated 3.2.1995, 1.11.1995, 19.5.1996 all advise me via Fitch, Abbott and Olsen that the documents I sought and still seek did not exist. In this regard Mr Olsen SA Water to supply me with documents for a later period which did and do exist. Letters Letter MFI, 100876, SA Water 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive (with enclosures: Data sheets of radiological monitoring of SA Water storages from 1964 to 1995), and Letter MFI 00876, SA Water Corp 10713/95, E.J. Phipps, Chief Executive confirm that with the supply of the documents covering the data from 1964 I now had all documents which exist.

I refer also to the letter to me from then Minister Hill dated 19 June 2003. In this letter the State Labor Government advises me that “Your matter is receiving attention and a response will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.” The letter is signed by Carolyne Lee, Office Manager for the Minister for Environment and Conservation.

How much longer will the State Government be in providing me with an answer to my requests? Can I see the documents that record the readings from the radiological monitoring of SA drinking water storages from 1956 until 1963 please?

I have been quite patient in this matter. I know how slowly the wheels of government move. As all South Australians do. I beg therefore, some sign that the State government can handle the truth in a spirit of openness worthy of a body which attempts to represent the will of the people, and which was elected on the basis of that promise of openness and democracy in public administration.

I find it highly lamentable and deplorable that the State Government has expressed views that convey the judgement, made by the current Premier recently, that the people of South Australia are ill informed on matters relating to nuclear undertakings and their consequences.

My experience provides much to contemplate in precisely these matters. I appreciate your eventual determination in relation to my request for the information I have been seeking from successive SA governments. I do not understand why it is taking what I perceive to be a very long time.

Yours Sincerely,

Paul Langley

Post by tracked package with signature on delivery and delivery confirmation notice on 8 Nov 2016

Let’s see how many years this takes.

Valuing the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power: A critical survey. Benjamin K. Sovacool

Valuing the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power: A critical survey

Benjamin K. Sovacool
Energy Governance Program, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, 469C Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259772, Singapore (as of 2016: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, United Kingdom)

Received 25 February 2008, Accepted 21 April 2008, Available online 2 June 2008

link to original abstract: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508001997

Abstract

This article screens 103 lifecycle studies of greenhouse gas-equivalent emissions for nuclear power plants to identify a subset of the most current, original, and transparent studies.

It begins by briefly detailing the separate components of the nuclear fuel cycle before explaining the methodology of the survey and exploring the variance of lifecycle estimates. It calculates that while the range of emissions for nuclear energy over the lifetime of a plant, reported from qualified studies examined, is from 1.4 g of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh (g CO2e/kWh) to 288 g CO2e/kWh, the mean value is 66 g CO2e/kWh. The article then explains some of the factors responsible for the disparity in lifecycle estimates, in particular identifying errors in both the lowest estimates (not comprehensive) and the highest estimates (failure to consider co-products). It should be noted that nuclear power is not directly emitting greenhouse gas emissions, but rather that lifecycle emissions occur through plant construction, operation, uranium mining and milling, and plant decommissioning.