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Earthquake Damage At Fukushima – is Industry’s Narrative Truthful or Certain?

I am again going to contrast the statements made by Barry Brook in regard to the events and outcomes at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 with the facts as presented by Mark Willacy. These facts are published in Willacy’s book, “Fukushima – Japan’s tsunami and the inside story of the nuclear meltdowns”, Willacy, M., Pan Macmillan, copyright 2013, Mark Willacy.

However, I will also include information related to the events which were first published and discussed in 2011. This post will take some time to complete.

The TV interview in which Prof Brook gives his opinion, specifically in relation to tsunami protection (in this post) is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo . Prof has written and spoken much about these matters and the reader can easily find of the Brook view on the internet if you are interested.

To quote Brook, in part, from the youtube link above:

Prof. Brook: “I think they (events) show the vulnerability of any human infrastructure to the forces of nature. Especially when they are unleashed with such fury as they were with that massive earthquake, the largest one to hit Japan in recorded times, and a 10 metre tsunami. I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect any infrastructure along a coastline like that to survive an event like that. But what it does highlight is that decisions were made back in the ‘60s, when that nuclear power plant was planned and built, they did not anticipate the scale of the natural disaster that occurred here.”

Prof. Brook: “They predicted up to a 6.5 metres tsunami and protected against that. But of course, as events turned out, the tsunami was even bigger than that. The tsunami washed over the plant. It seems like it damaged the diesel generators that were supplying backup power . There was a chain of diesel generators in fact, each one a redundant generator for the one before it. All of those were destroyed by the tsunami. The fuel tanks that would supply the diesel for many days for them seemed to be washed away. And the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it. The design of the 40 year old plant actually survived the earthquake. They were designed to survive an earthquake 7 times that what they were hit by and yet they survived and it was the tsunami that got them.”

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011.

end quotes from Prof Brook at the link above.

Was the tsunami the only thing that “got them”, as Barry says? What effect if any did the earthquake have on the radiological outcome at the plant and in Japan?

The earthquake generated the tsunami. What else did the earthquake cause?

In this blog I have included posts which give the IAEA considerations for the electrical grids which are connected to nuclear power plants. The IAEA states that the level of engineering and resilience built into such grids may be a significant additional cost for any nation considering generation to nuclear power.

It comes as no surprise then the electrical grid connected to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP failed for two reasons. 1. The earthquake caused all the nuclear reactors connected to the same grid to rapidly shut down. Thus the earthquake caused a blackout due to cessation of electrical generation. 2. The physical grid infrastructure – poles and wires – were damaged by the earthquake. At Fukushima this meant that more than one of the reactors was physically separated from the grid by the earthquake.

It can therefore be seen that the earthquake meant A. Fukushima Diiachi could not generate nuclear electricity as the quake had shut the reactors down. B. The Fukushima Diiachi Nuclear Power Plant was in Station Blackout for one reason: earth quake damage to nuclear infrastructure – the electrical grid.

The only hope for the quake affected nuclear plants (those in quake caused shut down, including Fukushima Daiichi) was the layered (defence in depth) multi systems which were supposed to the keep the reactors safe. These included A: Emergency Diesel generators. B. Rechargible batteries C. In the case of GE reactors, an emergency steam turbine attached physically to each reactor pressure. This turbine powered an emergency pump which pumped emergency coolant through the core via a part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). D. Other ECCS systems. These systems included heat exchangers (radiators) located on the roof of each reactor.

It is at this level of hardware that we must look for physical quake damage to structures. Among the most vulnerable are coolant pipes. The status of “Station Blackout” is a serious one.

I will now turn again to Mark Willacy and the people he interviewed, as recorded in his book:

“But it will be many years before the Japanese people know exactly what happened at Fukushima Daiichi on 11 March 2011. One of the key mysteries was role, if any, the magnitude 9 earthquake played in damaging the plant’s reactor cooling systems. Until lethal levels of radiation inside the reactors fall and workers can carry out comprehensive investigations, the truth about the tremor’s impact will remain a subject of conjecture and contention…..” Wallacy, M., “Fukushima”, page 112.

In its public statements the nuclear industry is adamant that no nuclear disaster would have occurred had the plant not been hit by a tsunami so huge and so powerful that nothing could have been done from the late 1960s until February 2011 to defend against it. Because no one could imagine such a tsunami to have been a rational and predictable threat to the Nuclear Power Plant. Not even Barry Brook could imagine it. Apparently. And therefore, no one who, due to their relevant academic qualifications and experience, could imagine such a thing, would not be listened to by an industry which, since 1945, has claimed that it KNOWS EVERYTHING about nuclear reactors. The industry can’t imagine a tsunami which did occur, it can’t imagine piping and valve damage which might or might not have occurred, it can’t, despite the findings of the Ergen report of 1968 in ECCS and meltdown, imagine the mass production of reactor core meltdowns from a single event, and it claims everything done since has been roaringly successful. At the time of the disaster the British Chief Scientist claimed that the meltdown would be insignificant and would be of concern for just a few hours and for a few metres around the plant. Yet, five years after the disaster this was written in an academic paper by a qualified expert: “More than 5 years since the disaster, internal exposure levels on the order of several thousand or several tens of thousands of becquerels are still being detected in those who regularly consume wild boar, wild birds, wild vegetables, or mushrooms that are highly contaminated, with a frequency of about several persons per 10,000 people (Tsubokura et al., 2014).” Source: Exposure and current health issues in Minamisoma M. Tsubokura Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital, 2-54-6 Takamicho, Haramachi-ku, Minamisoma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan; e-mail: tsubokura-tky@umin.ac.jp

No doubt Barry Brook might grown his own food if he lived in Minamisoma. He believes, it seems, and in my opinion, everything the nuclear industry tells him. If I lived in Minamisoma I would grow my own food under quite specific conditions. Being a graduate of an agricultural High School being a bit of a help to me. I topped the school in Agricultural Science in my final year. Would I live there at all? People love the land they were born upon in any nation. Such is the curse of nuclear power that some people pined for their land and became ill upon evacuation. Had they stayed they would have been at risk of reduced life expectancy due to un-remediated fallout. The cleanup in Japan is still on going. See previous posts. As I have pointed out previously, the declared extent of decontamination in Japan has enable some evacuees to return to their homes. The residual contamination remaining in those cleanup areas being about the same, roughly, as the Maralinga lands in South Australia after cleanup there. The risk of radiogenic cancer in the Maralinga Lands in 1 in 50,000 over 50 years. The owners of the Maralinga lands had been suffering forced removal from their lands from the 1950s until the 1990s, with full return of lands completed in the 21st century. Many people died waiting to return.

In Japan many people are concerned that they have been economically forced to return to places prior to a proper cleanup. In Australia, many people are concerned that the Maralinga cleanup was a dud, cheap, and insufficient. As usual vitrification in nuclear residues resulted in explosions and so elements including plutonium were simply buried in trenches. In Japan, great piles of contaminated material, so active the piles have to be shielded with sand bag shielding in order to protected nuclear garbage workers, remain in the open air. A minority of the material is under cover in interim storage.

But all of this is claimed to be of no consequence according to the nuclear industry.

Since the 1990s, when the Maralinga cleanup was designed around the new intervention level proposed by the ICRP planned for the 21 century, many Australians have stated that the new levels allowed are too high. And that the risk at Maralinga is too high. The ICRP intervention level is 10 mSv. The actual level aimed at Maralinga was 5 mSv. Japan complies with the guidelines. And that fact is in actual reality no comfort for many many affected Japanese people. No comfort at all. Because those people do not trust either nuclear authorities or their own government. Given the fact that the Japanese people are renowned for their loyalty and compliance, what has caused the change? Was it too many nuclear lies? See “Protection of the public in situations of prolonged radiation exposure. The application of the Commission’s system of radiological protection to controllable radiation exposure due to natural sources and long-lived radioactive residues.” which is shown in abstract here: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10962071 The fact of the matter is were it not for nuclear industry, having to cope with living in areas contaminated with long lived fission products would not be a possibility or actuality outside of a nuclear war. And that also remains a possibility. See also : “Application of ICRP Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or Radiation Emergency
Per Hedemann-Jensen Head of Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Danish Decommissioning, Risø
” at https://gnssn.iaea.org/RTWS/general/Shared%20Documents/Environmental%20Assessment/TM-52829%2013-17%20June%202016/Presentations%2014%20June%202016/09-TM-52829_Hedemann-Jensen-3.pdf which states in reference to the IAEA: “Publication 111: 3.1. Justification of protection strategies Para 27: Justification of protection strategies goes far beyond the scope of radiological protection as they may also have various economic, political, environmental, social,
and psychological consequences” The Danish authorities comment:

“Comment: If radiation protection guidance on justification of
protection strategies is going to be overwhelmed or
discounted by other considerations than radiological
factors, it raises the question of the ICRP recommendations
and other international guidance.” The situation is such in parts of nuclear industry afflicted Japan that hospitals cannot get staff. Meanwhile, evacuees have been economically forced back to their homes by government. In at least one area of Japan, this has compromised the treatment of diabetes. Many questions about both the accident and consequences remain, and distrust of official information remains among many affected communities. Social and other factors are now empowering communities in Japan to question government edicts based upon IAEA and ICEP recommendations. A court case underway in Japan related to economically return of people to land now remediated to ICRP standard according to IAEA procedures highlights the fact that in a democracy citizens remain free to dispute government decisions. Or “If radiation protection guidance on justification of protection strategies is going to be overwhelmed or
discounted by other considerations than radiological factors, it raises the question of the ICRP recommendations and other international guidance.”
Source: Per Hedemann-Jensen Head of Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Danish Decommissioning, Risø. Nuclear industry responds by calling those who disagree with the ICRP and IAEA in these matters “radiophobes”. The Japanese government responds to the disagreement coming from its people with more and more imposed secrecy, and greater compliance with international nuclear bodies. Looked at in another way, the Japanese government obeys the IAEA and ICRP. However there is nothing in the Japanese Constitution, I imagine, which gives either IAEA or the ICRP any authority over the Japanese people. No ordinary Japanese person ever voted for government by IAEA and ICRP.

It is little wonder the world nuclear industry via its local mouthpieces and puppets in every land continues to claim the effects of the nuclear disaster have no consequence. Nor is it any surprise that the nuclear industry continues to illegally diagnose opponents to its dictates and insults as being “radiophobic”.

I turn again to Willacy’s book:

“Reactor 1 at Fukushima Daiichi was the first version [of its type] , and it is possible that its earthquake resistance was a little more vulnerable than the other reactors,” Naotaka Takamatsu. Takamatsu was the deputy general of the Seismic Safety Division of JNES, one of the main government agencies charged with carrying out reactor inspections.” (Willacy, Fukushima, pages 112 and 113).

Takamatsu spent the 25 years prior to that designing quake proof piping and other things for nuclear reactors. This included the piping systems for reactors 2 and 3 for the Onagawa Nuclear Plant. This person was Japan’s leading expert on the impact of earthquake upon nuclear power plants.

Willacy says this of Mr. Takamatsu “He was deeply concerned that not enough that not enough investigation into the possible damage caused to the Fukushima Daiichi reactors by the earthquake.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 113).

Willacy quotes Takamatsu thus : “TEPCO has not assessed how equipment … at Fukushima Daiichi shook during the earthquake and whether they were functioning after the earthquake or not…I regret this has not progressed….I just think they should make more effort.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 113.)

On the same page Willacy points out that the Japanese Diet (Parliament) had considered the question of earthquake damage. Willacy reports Takamatsu considers the piping to be the most vulnerable structures to quake damage in the reactors. “When an earthquake damages the piping, the system collapses. Then radioactive water flows out. So piping damage is a possibility, yes”. (Willacy, Fukushima, page 113, quoting Takamatsu.)

Water continues to be pumped into the Rukushima Daiichi reactors for cooling purposes. It continues to leak out as contaminated water. Only about a million tons of this radioactive water has been stored in the water containers at the TEPCO site at Fukushima. See photo above. The rest has flowed into the Pacific Ocean. Which is perfectly safe according to nuclear authorities. Such people appear to be the only ones happy about this. Then again, such people promised such an event would never happen. (See the NRC short history, the chapter entitled “The ECCS controversy”. Download form here: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0175/ Search for “ECCS” in Chapter 2. Read from : “The report offered assurances about the improbability of a core meltdown and the reliability of ECCS
designs, but it also acknowledged that a loss-of-coolant
accident could cause a breach of containment if the ECCS
failed to perform. Therefore, containment could no longer
be regarded as an inviolable barrier to the escape of radioactivity.
This finding represented a milestone in the evolution
of reactor regulation. In effect, it imposed a modified
approach to reactor safety.” (Source: US NRC, “A short history of Nuclear Regulation 1946 -2009”, USA.)

If a pipe breaks, reactor containment could be breached. No wonder TEPCO and the rest of the industry is bothering very much to study the matters of critical interest. Is that why some of those water tanks had to be hurriedly erected at the Fukushima site? Why is the water leaking out???? Sill no worries, Barry reckons there is no quake damage at Fukushima Diiachi. There is no account of the tsunami damaging any aspect of the reactor pressure vessels or the attached fitments, including ECCS pipes.

It will take more than 3 decades from now before humans can tolerate the radiation exposure involved in entering the reactors. By 2050 the world may know what quake damage actually did occur on 11 March 2011 at Fukushima Diachi. The expert Mr. Takamatsu is one who is worried that the quake caused critical damage which made emergency core cooling systems inevitable. He cannot prove such damage occurred. He cannot prove it did not occur. He doesn’t know. He states TEPCO has not put the study in required to discern what damage was likely. Mr. Takamatsu states with expert authority that the pipes of cooling system was not designed for the 50 second vibration of the magnitude quake. Barry Brook, kangaroo expert, disagrees and tells the world the quake caused no damage at Fukushima. Yet Mr. Brook must surely know the earthquake caused grid blackout. For reactors are all shut down by earthquakes. A solar plant would have kept generating until the last panel shattered. No one would have been evacuated from such a solar plant.

Turning again to Willacy: “The (Japanese) Parliamentary report into the nuclear disaster found that one very violent tremor had shaken the plant violently for more than 50 seconds – far longer than than its design standard.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 114.)

The parliamentary report states that the safety agency NISA was “careless” and illogical in its conclusion that the quake had no negative effects on the reactor cooling systems. (bidi).

The parliamentary investigators needed to get inside the reactor building for reactor 1 to visually inspect the emergency core cooling system isolation condensers for quake damage. For “It was known that they (the isolation condensers) had stopped working soon after the quake hit, and that it was believed to have led to the early meltdown of Reactor 1. But TEPCO would have none of it. It would do everything in its power to thwart their inspection.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 114).

When parliamentary investigator Mr Tanaka questioned Mr. Toshimitsu Tamai about conditions inside the reactor building for reactor 1, Tamai stated that the building was in complete darkness. The was a risk of injury. They might stumble into a high radiation area, etc. TEPCO refused to guide the investigators in their inspection tour. Due to the evidence given to investigator Tanaka by TEPCO’s Tamai, the tour of reactor 1’s building and isolation condensers (part of the ECCS) was called off.

Willacy obtained a copy of the discussion between Tanaka and Tamai. Willacy’s observations of the exchange are compelling. Anyone who had to accept the statements of Tamai as truth could not allow anyone to enter the building.

HOWEVER:

“But, much later, Mitsuhiko Tanaka learned the truth. The building was not in darkness. The cover was not blocking the sunlight. Not only that, but a series of powerful mercury lamps had been installed and could throw as much light as the headlights of 40 cars. The investigators could have easily accessed the Reactor 1 building. TEPCO had misled the official panel appointed by the nation’s parliament.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 114).

Willacy goes on to describe Tanaka’s rage at being lied to by TEPCO. There are many people around the world and in Japan who share the rage, for repeatedly TEPCO and the world nuclear industry lied and gave false and inadequate narrative of the events. By now, most people will have forgotten about the mass production of a rank of reactors which all demonstrated ECCS failure and meltdown. Events predicted as far back as 1969 by non-industry experts and denied by industry experts, including government lackeys of the nuclear industry. I recall that when reactor 1 exploded, the Australian SBS tv news report of the event included the voice over of an “expert” from the Australian National University which stated “This is normal.” It doesn’t get much blacker than that. As for the danger of nuclear plumbing and loss of containment, Ralph Lapp explained that in the early 1970s in his essay in the New York Times.

Nuclear authorities must think the people of the world have the memory of goldfish. They are confident in their lies but there is very little variety in the way they go about things. They would have it that:

“in any sort of major accident in any industry there’s a period of introspection afterwards. Looking at what went wrong. Just like in anything in our lives. And trying to take the salient lessons and use that in future is a …I see the announcements of governments around the world to re-look at the safety of their current nuclear power plants. That’s an eminently sensible thing to do because you can look at all of the contingencies that they have allowed for and say well, what if the situation in Japan had happened to us, are we prepared? That’s learning from the lessons of history.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011.

TEPCO is caught lying to the lead investigator of the Japanese committee charged with investigating the Fukushima nuclear disaster. How is this enabling ANYONE to “learn lessons of history” Prof Brooks? What is your bias and preference doing in this “learning” process? Are you simply so inculcated yourself that you can’t think independently? What are you trying to teach us? Is a nuclear compliant population so important to you that you feel contrary evidence can just be ignored by you as you “teach” the Australian population? You are not my lecturer sir. I am not subject to your assessment. As an Australian sir, you are subject to mine, to the extent that I can communicate with government and government bodies.

“TEPCO denied that it had intentionally lied but admitted ‘a mistake had made..’ But, by this time, the investigation commission had released its final report, without confirming whether the emergency isolation condensers had been damage or not. The report did rule that there was a possibility that pipes had burst during the quake, causing what is called a ‘small break loss of coolant accident’…” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 116.)

In the book Fukushima Willacy records TEPCO’s point of view. Based on its inspection of reactor (un fuelled) at the time of the disaster, TEPCO concluded that none of the reactors suffered earthquake damage. “The Parliamentary Committee dismissed ‘such results and conclusions [as] very uneliable’. (Willacy, Fukushima, page 117, reference 44. Which is: The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, page 26.

The Executive Summary of the report is here: https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf On page 31 of the Executive summary the following is stated: “However, according to several
workers involved in the manual suspension of IC who responded to our investigation, they stopped IC (isolation condensor) to check whether coolant was leaking from IC and other pipes because the reactor pressure was falling rapidly. While the operator’s explanations are reasonable and appropriate, TEPCO’s explanation is irrational.
6. There is no evidence that the safety relief (SR) valve was opened at Unit 1, though this should have taken place in the case of an accident. (Such records are available for Units 2 and 3.) We found that the sound of the SR valve opening for Unit 2 was heard at the Central Control Room and at Unit 2, but no one working at Unit 1 heard the sound of the Unit 1 SR valve opening. It is therefore a possibility that the SR valve might not have worked in Unit 1. In this case, a minor LOCA caused by the seismic
motion could have taken place in Unit 1.” end quote.

I submit that Prof. Barry Brook’s description of the effects of earthquake upon the Fukushima Diiachi on 11 March 2011 is totally ignorant of the facts as presented by many qualified experts and fly in the face of the independent commission set up by the Japanese Parliament (Diet). It is confirmed that expert investigators concern aspects of TEPCO’s explanations regarding the quake are “irrational”.

Thus any narrative based upon the nuclear industry view, in line with TEPCO’s may fairly be said to be “irrational”. For the industry view is that there is no possibility of quake damage to any structure or sub structure, such as coolant pipes and valves. This is based upon TEPCO’s inspection of reactor 5, which was neither fuelled or hot at the time of the quake. TEPCO could have and still lcan examine the Isolation Condensers of reactor 1. As far as I know, it still has not done so. It has lied to the independent investigators in order to keep the investigators away from those condensers. At least that is my opinion of TEPCO’s motive for its claimed “mistake”.

Yet Prof Brook still considers the industry provided narrative the best one available for his purposes.

Interesting that. I would have thought the actual evidence would have been more important than the mere opinions TEPCO which him and everyone else wants and needs us to have. After all, it takes a lot of effort to suck local populations into the position where they trust nuclear industry. There is now a real problem in that regard in Japan.

And Port Willunga.

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Additional risk of diabetes exceeds the increased risk of cancer caused by radiation exposure after the Fukushima disaster.

refer previous post. See original document at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28957385
see also http://www.diabetesandenvironment.org/home/contam/radiation , “Diabetes and the Environment – Radiation” for an accounting of diabetes rates in high fallout areas due to the Chernobyl accident.

PLoS One. 2017 Sep 28;12(9):e0185259. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0185259. eCollection 2017.

Additional risk of diabetes exceeds the increased risk of cancer caused by radiation exposure after the Fukushima disaster.
Murakami M1,2, Tsubokura M3,4, Ono K5, Nomura S6,7, Oikawa T3.
Author information
Abstract

The 2011 Fukushima disaster led to increases in multiple risks (e.g., lifestyle diseases and radiation exposure) and fear among the public. Here, we assessed the additional risks of cancer caused by radiation and diabetes related to the disaster and the cost-effectiveness of countermeasures against these conditions. Our study included residents of the cities of Minamisoma and Soma (10-40 km and 35-50 km north of the Fukushima Daiichi (N° 1) Nuclear Power Station, respectively). We used the loss of life expectancy (LLE) as an indicator to compare risks between radiation exposure and diabetes. We also estimated the cost-effectiveness of radiation-related countermeasures, including restricted food distribution, decontamination, and whole-body counter tests and interventions. Metformin therapy was selected as a representative management for diabetes. The diabetes-related LLEs among residents were 4.1 (95% confidence interval: 1.4-6.8) ×10-2 years for the whole population and 8.0 (2.7-13.2) ×10-2 years for 40s to 70s in a scenario that considered the additional incidence of diabetes during the first 10 years. The cancer-related LLEs caused by lifetime exposure to radiation were 0.69 (2.5-97.5 percentile: 0.61-0.79) ×10-2 years for the whole population and 0.24 (0.20-0.29) ×10-2 years for 40s to 70s. The diabetes-related LLEs among residents in the above-mentioned scenario were 5.9-fold and 33-fold higher than those attributed to average radiation among the whole population and among the 40s to 70s age groups, respectively. The costs per life-years saved of the radiation countermeasures (i.e., restricted food distribution, decontamination, and whole-body counter tests and interventions) were >1 to >4 orders of magnitude higher than those of general heath checkups and conventional management for diabetes. Our findings indicate that countermeasures to mitigate diabetes are warranted. Policy-makers’ and individuals’ understanding of multiple risks after any disaster will be essential to saving the lives of victims.

PMID: 28957385 PMCID: PMC5619752 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0185259

Exposure and current health issues in Minamisoma

Please see the original paper at the link http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146645316666708

Please also see additional health data at “A First: Medical Data Obtained from Minami-soma Municipal General Hospital in Fukushima, at https://nuclear-news.net/2018/10/13/a-first-medical-data-obtained-from-minami-soma-municipal-general-hospital-in-fukushima/

Exposure and current health issues in Minamisoma M. Tsubokura Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital, 2-54-6 Takamicho, Haramachi-ku, Minamisoma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan; e-mail: tsubokura-tky@umin.ac.jp

INTRODUCTION

The city of Minamisoma is located in Hamadori in Fukushima Prefecture. After the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, three evacuation zones were set within the city: one within a 20-km radius of the plant, another between 20- and 30-km radiuses of the plant, and the third outside the 30-km radius. As vertical radioactive contamination differed between locations within the city, the evacuation zone demarcation was not consistent with the degree of contamination and became one of the causes of inequality, conflict, and other issues. Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital, located near the coast within the 30-km radius of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (approximately 23 km from the plant), was the only hospital in the 30-km radius evacuation zone to maintain outpatient services in the immediate aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. It played a central role not only in postdisaster health care but also in radiation response. This article reports on the current radiation exposure levels in the Soso region, and provides an overview of the health effects of the nuclear disaster

RADIATION SCREENING TESTS AND RADIATION EXPOSURE TO DATE

Various reports have shown that internal and external exposure levels of local residents after the Fukushima nuclear accident were very low. In particular, there has been successful containment of internal exposure, which became a long-term issue in the case of the nuclear incident at Chernobyl. In Minamisoma, Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital led an effort to commence internal exposure screening tests for residents in July 2011 (Hayano et al., 2014), and external exposure screening tests using integrated dosimeters in October 2011 (Nomura et al., 2015). Both tests are currently ongoing. At Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital, difficulties were encountered in measuring internal exposure using an on-vehicle whole-body counter when the screening was introduced in July 2011 because the vehicle did not provide sufficient radiation shielding. In September 2011, whole-body counters were installed in the hospital and have since been used for screening. In total, some 100,000 people have been screened. For approximately 99% of all children, including elementary and middle school students, in the city, internal exposure levels were below the minimum level for detection (Tsubokura et al., 2015a). Similar results have been observed in other municipalities. More than 5 years since the disaster, internal exposure levels on the order of several thousand or several tens of thousands of becquerels are still being detected in those who regularly consume wild boar, wild birds, wild vegetables, or mushrooms that are highly contaminated, with a frequency of about several persons per 10,000 people (Tsubokura et al., 2014). However, internal exposure levels are not likely to increase for those who consume foods distributed through regular channels. External exposure levels have also been maintained at low levels. The total exposure dose for elementary and middle school children in Minamisoma who underwent external and internal exposure screening tests in 2012 was between 0.025 and 3.49 mSv year1 (median 0.70 mSv year1 ). Results showed that the annual exposure dose was <1 mSv year -1 for 77.9% of the children (Tsubokura et al., 2015b).

INCREASED PREVALENCE OF CHRONIC CONDITIONS

As described above, radiation exposure levels of local residents have been maintained at low levels, and it is unlikely that radiation will affect their health directly, such as by damaging cells in their bodies. However, there are serious postdisaster health effects in the form of increased prevalence of chronic conditions. The increased prevalence of diabetes is particularly serious. The number of patients with diabetes has been increasing every year, and in some age groups, the prevalence rate has increased by approximately 5% since the earthquake. Nomura et al. reported that higher risk of diabetes, compared with the predisaster level, has persisted for several years (Nomura et al., 2016). While similar results were observed in the Fukushima Health Management Survey, it is noteworthy that similar trends can be observed among residents living outside the evacuation zones. It is well known that diabetes is a risk factor for myocardial infarction and cerebral infarction. It has been reported that the number of patients with cerebral infarction admitted to Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital has more than doubled since the nuclear disaster (Gilmour et al., 2015). In addition, diabetes has been associated with increased risk of cancer. It has been reported that the hazard ratio for cancer incidence among patients with diabetes is approximately 1.2, and that the risk of liver and pancreatic cancers, in particular, is approximately twice as high for patients with diabetes. It is anticipated that the risk of cancer from diabetes and other lifestyle-related diseases is greater than that from radiation exposure.

WHY IS THE PREVALENCE OF CHRONIC CONDITIONS INCREASING AND WHICH GROUPS ARE AFFECTED?

Why is the prevalence of diabetes increasing? Stress, changes in the social environment, and changes in living arrangements may be some of the factors, but the answer is not known conclusively. Results of the Fukushima Health Management Survey showed that the prevalence of diabetes increased more among residents from evacuation zones than among residents from outside evacuation zones. On the other hand, a study on residents of the cities of Minamisoma and Soma found no difference in the prevalence of diabetes based on whether or not residents had evacuated (Nomura et al., 2016). Results of research conducted at Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital, published in July 2016, showed that among the patients with diabetes who continued to receive treatment at the hospital after the disaster, deterioration was greater among patients living in urban centres compared with patients living in suburbs (Leppold et al., 2016). It is essential that further research is conducted and interventions undertaken for selected target groups. In terms of intervention, it is important not to link onset of diabetes or deterioration in diabetic condition to the patient’s behaviour or character traits. Physical exercise, healthy eating, and diet therapy are basic to controlling diabetes. However, although fast food, for instance, may be bad for the body, one should not forget that there are many people, due to financial difficulties, who have few other economically viable options. The only thing that can be done is to inform people about such circumstances, and to engage repeatedly in outreach to patients through health seminars, frequent visits, and other educational activities.

.
SOCIAL FACTORS OF HEALTH CARE

If diabetes is the most significant health problem, the most serious social problem is the loss of informal care since the disaster. Informal care can be described as regular care and assistance to the person requiring support that is made possible through a network of people. For example, consider an elderly person admitted to hospital for pneumonia. Before the disaster, he could have been discharged after a few days’ stay and returned home. However, this can no longer happen because there is no younger generation who can look after him at home. He cannot go and live in a cramped temporary housing unit because it is not barrier-free. As a result, the hospital stay becomes longer and he grows physically weaker. He may have to look for a residential care home, otherwise he cannot be discharged. As a result, he becomes physically weaker and becomes ill again. The cure rate declines. The birth rate in Fukushima Prefecture has rebounded sharply since the disaster. There is a shortage of kindergarten teachers, and many advertisements for them. On the other hand, the postdisaster evacuation, the issue of radiation, and changes in the social structure have been harmful to health, which was formerly protected by a network comprising the local community, neighbours, and family members. A study by Dr Morita of Soma Central Hospital showed that nursing care costs per elderly person in Minamisoma have increased 1.3 fold since the disaster (Morita et al., 2016). Health problems in temporary housing are becoming long-term problems. A study by Dr Shimada of Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital found that the prevalence of diabetes and other chronic conditions was high even in Summer 2015. Many of those who have secured a new home in the last 5 years, and have a network that allows them to live with their families, have already left temporary housing units. On the other hand, those whose family ties have been disrupted and who have difficulty managing their own health tend to remain in temporary housing. For patients with diabetes who find themselves in such circumstances, it is important that measures are implemented at the individual level, and dietary control and exercise are promoted. There is no point in arguing that stress is the underlying problem for such patients. Dr Ozaki of Minamisoma Municipal General Hospital reported that the time taken from a patient with breast cancer finding a lump in the breast for the first time to visiting a hospital has increased since the disaster (Ozaki et al., 2016, submitted). The delay in visiting a hospital may contribute to discovery of breast cancer at more advanced stages. Although the cause is not known, it was found that there was a strong tendency for those not living with their children to visit a hospital less frequently. Some readers may have the experience of visiting a hospital only at the insistence of their children. The absence of members of the younger generation in patients’ homes tends to keep patients away from hospitals, even when they feel something is wrong with their health. Changes

CONCLUSION

The accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused serious radioactive contamination, second only to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster which was rated level 7 on the International Nuclear Events Scale. Health effects of radiation exposure are normally at the core of various effects of radiation disasters. Fortunately, the radiation exposure levels for Fukushima residents were shown not to be significant. On the other hand, a significant health risk has resulted from changes in the social environment and life arrangements, increased prevalence of diabetes and other chronic conditions, and loss of interpersonal relations. Future measures should focus not only on radiation protection, but also on human networking, social infrastructure, and protection of culture and history that are intangible. The disaster has raised issues that had been embedded in this region since before the disaster, for which there are no quick solutions. There is a need to recognise that the effect of a nuclear disaster is not limited to radiation, and that other effects of the disaster have an even greater impact on health. It is time that society as a whole came to consider what could be done to solve these problems. Healthcare professionals are not necessarily required to take extraordinary actions. What would be required can be summed up as maintaining the existing healthcare system, working together with other professionals, and engaging in daily practice. There is a shortage of healthcare professionals in the region, particularly nurses and young healthcare staff members. There is a need to create a mechanism for providing incentives for young healthcare professionals to work in Fukushima, so that they can see their jobs in Fukushima in a positive light. Fukushima is drawing national attention because of the radiation issue. As time passes and attention wanes, the community will have to think how it can differentiate itself from other regions in order to survive. Presentations at scientific conferences, publication of articles, and close inter-regional and international exchange are important components of such efforts.

REFERENCES Gilmour, S., Sugimoto, A., Nomura, S., Oikawa, T., 2015. Long-term changes in strokerelated hospital admissions after the Fukushima triple disaster. J. Am. Geriatr. Soc. 63, 2425–2426. Hayano, R.S., Watanabe, Y.N., Nomura, S., et al., 2014. Whole-body counter survey results 4 months after the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident in Minamisoma City, Fukushima. J. Radiol. Prot. 34, 787–799. Leppold, C., Tsubokura, M., Ozaki, A., et al., 2016. Sociodemographic patterning of longterm diabetes mellitus control following Japan’s 3.11 triple disaster: a retrospective cohort study. BMJ Open 6, e011455. Morita, T., Leppold, C., Tsubokura, M., Nemoto, T., Kanazawa, Y., 2016. The increase in long-term care public expenditure following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. J. Epidemiol. Community Health 70, 738.
Nomura, S., Tsubokura, M., Hayano, R., et al., 2015. Comparison between direct measurements and modeled estimates of external radiation exposure among school children 18 to 30 months after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Environ. Sci. Technol. 49, 1009–1016. Nomura, S., Blangiardo, M., Tsubokura, M., et al., 2016. Postnuclear disaster evacuation and chronic health in adults in Fukushima, Japan: a long-term retrospective analysis. BMJ Open 6, e010080. Ozaki, A., Leppold, C., Tsubokura, M., et al., 2016. Social isolation and cancer management after the 2011 triple disaster in Fukushima, Japan. A case report of breast cancer with patient and provider delay. Medicine 95, e4027. Tsubokura, M., Kato, S., Nomura, S., et al., 2014. Reduction of high levels of internal radiocontamination by dietary intervention in residents of areas affected by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster: a case series. PloS One 9, e100302. Tsubokura, M., Kato, S., Nomura, S., et al., 2015a. Absence of internal radiation contamination by radioactive cesium among children affected by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster. Health Phys. 108, 39–43. Tsubokura, M., Kato, S., Morita, T., et al., 2015b. Assessment of the annual additional effective doses amongst Minamisoma children during the second year after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster. PloS One 10, e0129114.

Expert fore warning of the 2011 Tsunami Ignored and Suppressed by Nuclear Authorities.

this post is in progress. Not finished.

I am again going to contrast the statements made by Barry Brook in regard to the tsunami defences at Fukushima Daiichi with the facts as presented by Mark Willacy. These facts are published in Willacy’s book, “Fukushima – Japan’s tsunami and the inside story of the nuclear meltdowns”, Willacy, M., Pan Macmillan, copyright 2013, Mark Willacy.

An interesting aspect of the work of Barry Brook is this: The views expressed by Barry are very frequently attributed by Barry to people who are, according to Barry, experts in nuclear industry. I have heard Barry’s public broadcasts in which Barry makes this attribution. I have not heard Barry give the names of his advisors and friends in the nuclear industry. However it is extremely likely Barry is correct in his attributions. Barry’s statements of opinions and claimed facts can reasonably be assumed to have been provided to Barry by unnamed – as far as I am aware – experts in the nuclear industry. The credibility of Barry statements ride therefore upon the credibility of the nuclear industry.

Of course it is no surprise to hear Barry Brook mirror the statements of nuclear experts from around the world in 2011. The narrative of the global nuclear industry as broadcast by the mass media and the narrative provided by Barry Brook were, as I recall, mutually re-affirming.

Here again is a selected, partial transcript of Barry Brook’s Australian ABC TV interview (please watch the complete interview at the youtube link below) :
“Prof. Brook: “I think they (events) show the vulnerability of any human infrastructure to the forces of nature. Especially when they are unleashed with such fury as they were with that massive earthquake, the largest one to hit Japan in recorded times, and a 10 metre tsunami. I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect any infrastructure along a coastline like that to survive an event like that. But what it does highlight is that decisions were made back in the ‘60s, when that nuclear power plant was planned and built, they did not anticipate the scale of the natural disaster that occurred here.”

Prof. Brook: “They predicted up to a 6.5 metres tsunami and protected against that. But of course, as events turned out, the tsunami was even bigger than that. The tsunami washed over the plant. It seems like it damaged the diesel generators that were supplying backup power . There was a chain of diesel generators in fact, each one a redundant generator for the one before it. All of those were destroyed by the tsunami. The fuel tanks that would supply the diesel for many days for them seemed to be washed away. And the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it. The design of the 40 year old plant actually survived the earthquake. They were designed to survive an earthquake 7 times that what they were hit by and yet they survived and it was the tsunami that got them.”

Prof Brook: “I think it’s clear that the risk that the tsunami faced and the fact that all of the redundant generators were wiped out in one blow suggests that there was not enough prudent forethought for that risk. And in any sort of major accident in any industry there’s a period of introspection afterwards. Looking at what went wrong. Just like in anything in our lives. And trying to take the salient lessons and use that in future is a …I see the announcements of governments around the world to re-look at the safety of their current nuclear power plants. That’s an eminently sensible thing to do because you can look at all of the contingencies that they have allowed for and say well, what if the situation in Japan had happened to us, are we prepared? That’s learning from the lessons of history.” End quote. Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011.

In a previous post I pointed out that Willacy had found that Dr.Yukinobu Okamura, the director of Japan’s Active Fault and Earthquake Research Centre, had, in 2007, found evidence in the geologic record that the Fukushima coast had been hit by massive tsunamis in its past. (Fukushima, page 26)

I also pointed out that in 2008 TEPCO engineers using simulations and calculations discovered that tsunamis as high as 15.7 metres were possible at the site of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. (Fukushima, page 29)

This discovery by TEPCO engineers was suppressed by TEPCO management from the Japanese people and Japanese government until 7 March 2011, or 4 days before the 3/11 quake and tsunami disaster. (Fukushima, page 29)

On 24 June 2009 the NISA panel set up to examine nuclear reactor safeguards thoroughly dismissed Dr.Yukinobu Okamura’s report of his findings regarding a previous tsunami which reached 3 to 4 kms inland from precisely the point at which Fukushima Daiichi had been built. The panel dismissed Dr. Okamura’s warning that there remained a risk that further very large tsunamis could again occur at the same place. During an interview in 2012 with Dr. Okamura, Mark Willacy asked Dr. Okamura what exactly he had said to the panel in June 2009. At that point, Willacy reports in his book that the government advisors which had to be present during the Willacy-Okamura interview objected. Dr. Okamura was not allowed to answer the question. This was 2012, at a stage when the world nuclear industry was promoting itself as open and honest. However, Willacy writes that the minutes of the 24 June 2009 NISA were open documents. In the research phase of his preparation for the interview, Willacy had asked to see the minutes and NISA had obliged. It is not by the efforts of the nuclear industry or its advocates that the world can know what happened at that meeting. It is due to the actions of Mark Willacy, an ABC journalist and expert on Japan. All it took was an open mind, a search for the truth and a lot of work. See Fukushima, pages 99 to 101. Willacy includes copious text from the minutes of 24 June 2009 in his book. Dr. Okamura’s findings were discounted completely, his warning of a huge tsunami being due ignored by the panel. A leading opponent of Dr. Okamura being the TEPCO representative (named Mr. Nishimura) on the panel of 2009. Not forgetting that since 2008 TEPCO management had been busy suppressing THE SAME CONCLUSION of grave risk of 15 metre tsunamis hitting the Fukushima coast, made by TEPCO’s own engineers using simulations and mathematics. I wonder where those engineers are now. I wonder at what threats were made to them in order to keep them silent.

How is that as an indicator for the credibility of the nuclear industry? A potent one in my opinion.

However, TEPCO engineers and Dr. Okamura were not the only experts to warn of massive – 15 metre plus – tsunamis hitting Fukushima Daiichi.

Mr. Willacy found more experts and interviewed them. And it turned out that for years nuclear authorities had tried to hide these suppressed but qualified people. If they were kangaroo experts talking about quakes and tsunamis, fair enough, but actually these people were and are experts in the field of tsunamis and earthquakes.

And it begs the question: how many people died as a result of the tsunami inland from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP simply because nuclear authorities (and a national government beholden to them or in thrall of them, or trusted them), suppressed technical information from 2008 on and failed to act upon this accurate information? The answer shocks the experts who were suppressed and fills them with grief to this day. 20,000 people or more died due to the suppression of the facts and the suppression of the experts by TEPCO management and a national government too impotent and fawning to conduct vigorous oversight of that lying and suppressive and oppressive industry.

Well might a kangaroo expert in Tasmania continue to defend the nuclear industry. Few in the actual know would though. In my opinion.

Willacy: “You must be disappointed that no one took your research seriously?…”

Dr. Okamura: “Of course it is. Not only for the nuclear power plant but for the 20,000 people who were killed….I think they could have reduced the death toll and saved some lives. But they failed to do so in time. I am extremely sorry and it is a shame.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 104.)

The claim made by Barry Brook in support of the allegedly “unforeseen” size of the 2011 tsunami look to me to be as scientific as the findings of a Vampire Convention in the Barr Smith library at Adelaide Uni. Though, as I read Willacy’s book, it became clear that there is indeed an Underworld.

Willacy also interviewed a Professor of Seismology (University of Tokyo) named Kunihiko Shimazaki. In 2002 this Professor forecast waves more than 10 metres were a danger at Fukushima. Prof Shimazaki was also President of the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction in Japan. The warning was given to a Japanese Cabinet committee. The Earthquake Research Committee held monthly meetings and Prof. Shimazaki headed an important sub committee to study the probability of future quakes and their locations. The Professor researched history of earthquakes in Japan. The Professor found that no one accepted that a large quake could occur at Fukushima. The Professor alerted the committees that a “huge” tremor could occur anywhere off the Fukushima coast. Attended by a huge tsunami. Professor Shimazaki predicted that a quake and tsunami the size of the 1896 quake was a danger to Fukushima. That 1896 quake was magnitude 8 plus and the tsunami waves were up to 38 metres high. The professor had retired by the time Mark Willacy had interviewed him, and so no government officials were present to control the interview. Prof. Shimazaki was free to speak his mind.

In July 2002 the Earthquake Research Committee paper, which warned that a quake and large tsunami, according to Shimazaki’s research, could impact Fukushima. However the published version of the report contained an additional paragraph the committee did not author or authorise. The additional paragraph claimed the report was limited in, effectively, geologic evidence which could be used as evidence. The unauthorised paragraph warned against using the report as the basis for disaster preparedness. Willacy gives the source for this in reference 36, being “The Great Tsunami Had Been Foreseen, But Not Been Included in Disaster Design”, Kagaku science journal, vol. 81, No. 10, October 2011, pp. 1002-06. This source by title alone shows the flagrant disregard for the tenants of “research first, speak later” shown by those actually ill informed non experts or experts out of relevant field (Kangaroos are not quakes nor tsunamis Barry. Stick to ‘Roos mate) who claim the quake and tsunami were unforeseeable. 2002 is not the earliest date of such a prediction, observation or expectation made by experts and historians.

2003 saw Prof. Shimazaki speak at the first meeting of the government’s Disaster Management Council. This council formed government disaster policy. He urged the council to study the Jogan earthquake of 869 and warned the Japanese Trench could generate earthquakes anywhere along Japan’s Pacific coast. This information was rejected by the council. It ran counter to the accepted views as the council knew of no earthquakes off Fukushima. The Professor told Willacy “That’s their logic. But that’s not seismology.” (Fukushima, page 107). In 2004 Prof. Shimazaki again warned the controllers of the Earthquake Research Committee that Fukushima’s coast was exposed to the threat of waves of more than 10 metres. Willacy writes that the professor was scoffed at and the committee moved to have his warning dismissed. “Shimazaki complained that he was ignored to save TEPCO some money”. (Willacy, Fukushima, page 107, reference 37, being: Martin Fackler, “Nuclear Disaster in Japan was avoidable, Critics Contend”, The New York Times, 9 March 2012, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/world/asia/critics-say-japan-ignored-warnings-of-nuclear-disaster.html

In order to alert the public, Prof. Shimazaki tried to make his findings public. However, government officers of the Disaster Management Committee requested that the Ministry not to make them public. Of the this, the Professor told Willacy “This is really unusual. I didn’t know what TEPCO done. I didn’t understand.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 107).

Willacy writes: “On 3 March 2011 – eight days before the tsunami crashed into Fukushima Daiichi – a secret meeting was held between senior civil servants from the Education and Science Ministry (the ministry in charge of the Earthquake Research Committee) and three nuclear power companies with reactors on the expanse of the Pacific coast in question: TEPCO, the Tuhoku Electric Company and the Japan Atomic Power Company. The utilities wanted the committee’s report watered down. “We didn’t know at the time about this meeting, it was a secret,” said Professor Shimazai. But since then he has seen the official notes of this furtive gathering. “The bureaucrats explained what would be made public in our report. Some TEPCO engineers asked them to change it.”…
“What would be made public was the possibility that a gigantic tsunami….could be triggered off Fukushima…… TEPCO and two other nuclear companies wanted the language softened. The power utilities did not want to give people the “misunderstanding” that massive earthquakes like Jogan had happened in the past. The bureaucrats blindly obeyed, promising to ‘do something so it may not induce such misunderstanding”….”So there was a subtle change made, but it watered our report down.” said Professor Shimazaki. “It made it better for TEPCO. (Willacy, Fukushima, page 108 reference 38 “Jogan quake report worried utilities
Tsunami alert softened days before 3/11”, Japan Times, FEB 27, 2012 at : https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/02/27/national/tsunami-alert-softened-days-before-311/#.W8I0x8dR1n4 )

Nuclear advocates including Barry Brook broadcast their learned opinion of the rationality, knowledge and intelligence of the nuclear industry. As shown by the statements above, although TEPCO engineers came to the same conclusions about the vulnerability of Fukushima NPP to massive quakes and tsunamis in 2008 as qualified experts in the field of quakes and tsunami, throughout the period March 2011, TEPCO continually attempted to muzzle anyone who tried to express the truth – even when expressed in appropriate channels. Total control of information was compelled in the matter of publication of truth to the general public. The nuclear industry wanted the public to believe that such a massive had not ever occurred at any time previously. But of course, it had. Which is precisely the knowledge base the scientists confirmed in the field, 3 – 4 km inland from Fukushima. And TEPCO knew it and did not want the public to know. The qualified scientists, so abused by the nuclear from 2002 onward, knew a massive quake and tsunami was over due off the Fukushma coast.

Far from being rational, scientific, intelligent, the actions of the nuclear industry in these regards attest, in my opinion, to the industry’s profound moral and ethical disabilities. It would be only human to convey this same profound disability to the industry’s independent advocates. There is no evidence though that Prof. Brook is of the same nature as the nuclear industry heads whose actions and lackings and arrogance and disregard for life, health and safety are so firmly described by Willacy. Prof. Brook is probably, in my opinion, clearly very inadequate when he researches things such as nuclear industry. He claims academic privilege when he communicates his mere opinions related to a field he possesses no training or little training or qualifications in. He can’t have it both ways. The privilege which springs from his actual qualifications may give him status in other things on campus. Away from the lecture theatre though, his opinions of the nature of nuclear industry have zero academic weight. He possesses one vote in this democracy. So do I. “I’m an academic and therefore I am right” does not wash with me. I’m too old with too many memories of evidence to the contrary of that one. Such academic arrogance has cost countless lives down through the ages. They sail their allegedly unsinkable views as if they were the crew of the Titanic prior to the famous and inevitable event. Reality is no respecter of anyone.

“Just days before the Great East Japan Earthquake, a government panel softened the wording of a report warning that a massive tsunami could strike northeastern Japan after three utilities with nuclear power plants begged it to do so, it has been learned.

According to interviews and documents made available Saturday, staff from Tokyo Electric Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co. and Japan Atomic Power Co. asked the secretariat of the Earthquake Research Committee to alter the draft of the report at a meeting on March 3, 2011.

The report suggested a massive tsunami similar to the one triggered by the Jogan Earthquake in 869 could be spawned off Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, they said.

A final version of the report has yet to be released in light of the earthquake and tsunami that actually hit the region eight days later, but some members of the committee called the revelation “unbelievable.”

The three utilities asked the secretariat in the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry to change the wording to avoid giving people the “misunderstanding” that massive quakes similar to the Jogan quake actually occurred in the past.

In reply, the secretariat told the three utilities, “We’re not changing the context but we’re going to do something so it may not induce such misunderstanding.”

A few days later the ministry revised the draft. The reworded version said “further study” is required to decide if massive quakes similar to the Jogan quake took place because “appropriate data are insufficient.”
Japan Times, 27 Feb, 2012, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/02/27/national/tsunami-alert-softened-days-before-311/#.W8I0x8dR1n4 (partial quote).

Denial of reality is not the sign of rational behaviour. The tsunami was NOT unforeseen, as claimed by ignorant industry advocates, it had been warned of in the modern era by qualified specialist researchers since 2002. And from about 869 in the official Japanese governmental records, which remain preserved and consulted by scholars.

What happens to researchers and scholars who do not toe the nuclear industry line is clearly described in Willacy’s book. And it is a travesty of corporate and governmental behaviour.

“The bureaucrats say they didn’t change any facts. But they watered it down. The earthquake (eight days later) show that, said Shimazaki…It was a harsh lesson for the professor about the realpolitik of nuclear safety, and a masterclass in the Machiavellian double dealing by the bureaucrats running the committee.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 109)

Willacy reports that an hour into the interview the Professor became upset, and appeared to be fighting back tears.

“Maybe I might have behaved differently and told people directly, so I could have saved people,” he said. “….This caused the loss of many people’s lives. So, so many. Almost 20,000.” “A year after the 2011 disaster, Shimazaki was fired as a member of the Earthquake Research Committee. One of Japan’s most eminent, and oracular, seismologists was off the team.” (Willacy, Fukushima, page 109, 110.)

Professor Shimazaki had been fighting to present his findings and have them accepted since 2002. His findings had been effectively suppressed by the industry and its captive government until the story broke in 2012. The tragic events of March 2011 at Fukushima have a human element. Had work on appropriate tsunami defences commenced in 2002 they would have been completed years before the disaster. Which may very well not have involved a nuclear disaster at all, and which may well have saved lives up and down the coast. And Prof. Shimazaki was one of a number of similarly muzzled and isolated qualified people attempting to warn of the very same hazard. Not to the liking of the nuclear industry, these experts remained isolated and discredited until after the disaster which proven them to be correct. From 2008 TEPCO knew them to be correct due to its own studies. From the first modern warnings in 2002, until the day of the disaster in 2011, TEPCO had spent nine years doing nothing with scientific and technical knowledge it knew to be true and correct. Doing nothing but mistreating and thwarting the scientists who independently had found the truth. These scientists had spent the same period of time trying to warn industry, government and the public. The industry would have none of it. It will likely be a long, long time before all that government and industry knew about the risk of quake and tsunami to Fukushima Daiichi and other plants comes out. Important people will have to have died of old age before the full accounting will be permitted to take place.

Not rational, but that’s the way it is done.

Is Glyphosate a Radiomemetic chemical?

Glad you asked.

“The Spermine Phosphate-Bound Cyclooctaoxygen
Sodium Epigenetic Shell of Euchromatin DNA is
Destroyed by the Epigenetic Poison Glyphosate”
Andreas J. Kesel 1,*, Eduard A. Struys 2 and Barbara Cellini 3
1 Chammünsterstr. 47, D-81827 München, Bavaria/Bayern, Germany
2 Metabolic Unit, Department of Clinical Chemistry, University Hospital Vrije Universiteit, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
3 Dipartimento di Neuroscienze, Biomedicina e Movimento, Sezione di Chimica Biologica, Università degli Studi di Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy
* Correspondence: andreas.kesel@gmx.de; Tel.: +49 (0)89-453 64 500

Partial quote from conclusion: “We allow us to conclude on basis of our, rather unequivocal, findings that glyphosate, ROUNDUP® and AMPA are major examples of slow-acting, insidious ‘epigenetic poisons’, (i) slowly eroding and detoriating human, animal and plant genomic integrity, (ii) rattening human, animal and plant inborne protection of hereditary information against mutation, and (iii) disturbing the processing of human, animal and plant genetic information by transcription. It is hence inevitable for us to define glyphosate, ROUNDUP® and AMPA as a significant threat for human, animal and plant genomic stability, especially for future human generations forced to live under the glyphosate-, ROUNDUP®- and AMPA-induced radiomimetic effects.” end quote. (Source: Kesel et. al. as above)

The radiomemetic chemicals (chemicals which interact with human cells in the same manner as ionising radiation) were identified in WW2, with mustard gas being positively identified as such as a result of Bari Incident. This laid the foundation for the first generation of chemotherapy agents. Other chemicals identified as radiomemetic include dioxin, and the herbicides 2.4T and 2,4,5 T

Although profound evidence shows that the effects of a combined doses of radiomemetic chemicals and ionising radiation are synergistic and not not merely additive, nuclear authorities continue to refuse to admit radiomemetic chemicals render humans far more vulnerable to doses of ionising radiation.

Radiomemetic Mustard Gas: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QxknazeuT4 Patients in the cancer ward of the Bari hospital experienced remission in many cases following the explosion at Bari. and:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5325736/ “”They learned about the medical effects from toxic exposures of servicemen, both the unintentional from a wartime disaster in Bari, Italy, and the intentional in the mustard gas experiments conducted at military and civilian facilities, including medical schools. Their interdisciplinary research produced an enormous amount of data on the health effects of mustard agents on animals and humans. However, the military heritage of cancer chemotherapy is not common knowledge because of longstanding government secrecy regarding chemical weapons research.” (source: “War What is i good for? Mustard Gas, by Mustard gas medicine
Susan L. Smith, PhD, at the link given above.

and

Australian Senate Notice Paper Question No 396 Publication Date: 20 August 2002
Hansard: Pages 3374-6
Defence: Chemical Weapons Testing
Senator: Allison
Senator Allison asked the Minister for Defence, upon notice, on 25 June 2002:

“With reference to the document recently released by the department, ‘Chemical Warfare Testing Sites (File No. A6456 R8216/10)’, written by a joint Australian/United States (US) survey team on suitable sites within Australia for chemical and biological weapons tests:

“Was this series of tests an extension of research on: (a) decontamination of water supplies containing nerve gas, carried out at Maralinga in 1959; (b) mustard gas tests, held on Brooks Island in 1944; and (c) malaria trials.”

The Senator was given an answer in the negative. However, I refer to the documents held at https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/3034033 , entitled “Index of documents held by Ann Munslow-Davies for the research into the Australian/British nuclear tests [electronic resource]” Among the government authored documents held Anne’s collection, at least one, from memory, implies mustard gas, as I recall from my reading of the document, being found to have been dissolved in the drinking water at Maralinga.

Yes folks, they know all about the radiomemetic chemicals. And continue to ignore them.

Fairly interesting.

“ANNE MUNSLOW-DAVIES, RESEARCHER NUCLEAR VETERANS ISSUES: They were concealed in a person’s back shed in Perth and for me to find these documents – it had on the title “‘Operation Lighthouse’ – pertaining to Maralinga” was like, “Oh, wow, what have I got here?”

GEOFF HUTCHISON: Anne Munslow-Davies, herself a daughter of a nuclear veteran, has found a staggering new plan for Maralinga which would intensify testing and use more people.

“ANNE MUNSLOW-DAVIES: What I would really like to see in those documents is the records from the Maralinga hospital.

To date, they have never been found and no-one knows their whereabouts.

PETER WEBB: But every now and again, when something comes up like this, Peter Webb comes up and says, “Hey!

I’m still here, I’m still alive, I’m still breathing’. What are you going to do about it?”

I still get the same answer – “Nothing, bugger off and die,” and that’s the sad part.” source: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, TV PROGRAM TRANSCRIPT
Broadcast: 21/05/2001
Secret documents detail plan to use servicemen in atomic tests
Reporter: Geoff Hutchison

My partial transcription: https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2013/03/02/operation-lighthouse/

The document in question, which strongly suggests, to say the least, the service personnel were exposed to drinking water tainted with mustard gas remains, I believe, among the documents held at Australian National University and available here: http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/20910/20020116-0000/members.optusnet.com.au/_seanmd/nuke/index.html

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/20910/20020116-0000/members.optusnet.com.au/_seanmd/nuke/decon1.html

http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/20910/20020116-0000/members.optusnet.com.au/_seanmd/nuke/decon2.html

Got that Christina and Brett?

Tsunami Defence at Fukushima Diiachi – a rebuttal of the Barry Brook position

The source of the information in this post is the book “Fukushima – Japan’s Tsunami and the inside story of the nuclear meltdowns”, by Mark Willacy, 9781742612959, MacMillan by Pan MacMillan Australia Pty Ltd. Copyright Mark Willacy 2013.

The TV interview in which Prof Brook gives his opinion, specifically in relation to tsunami protection (in this post) is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo . Prof has written and spoken much about these matters and the reader can easily find of the Brook view on the internet if you are interested.

To quote Brook, in part, from the youtube link above:

Prof. Brook: “I think they (events) show the vulnerability of any human infrastructure to the forces of nature. Especially when they are unleashed with such fury as they were with that massive earthquake, the largest one to hit Japan in recorded times, and a 10 metre tsunami. I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect any infrastructure along a coastline like that to survive an event like that. But what it does highlight is that decisions were made back in the ‘60s, when that nuclear power plant was planned and built, they did not anticipate the scale of the natural disaster that occurred here.”

Prof. Brook: “They predicted up to a 6.5 metres tsunami and protected against that. But of course, as events turned out, the tsunami was even bigger than that. The tsunami washed over the plant. It seems like it damaged the diesel generators that were supplying backup power . There was a chain of diesel generators in fact, each one a redundant generator for the one before it. All of those were destroyed by the tsunami. The fuel tanks that would supply the diesel for many days for them seemed to be washed away. And the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it. The design of the 40 year old plant actually survived the earthquake. They were designed to survive an earthquake 7 times that what they were hit by and yet they survived and it was the tsunami that got them.”

Prof Brooke: “I think it’s clear that the risk that the tsunami faced and the fact that all of the redundant generators were wiped out in one blow suggests that there was not enough prudent forethought for that risk. And in any sort of major accident in any industry there’s a period of introspection afterwards. Looking at what went wrong. Just like in anything in our lives. And trying to take the salient lessons and use that in future is a …I see the announcements of governments around the world to re-look at the safety of their current nuclear power plants. That’s an eminently sensible thing to do because you can look at all of the contingencies that they have allowed for and say well, what if the situation in Japan had happened to us, are we prepared? That’s learning from the lessons of history.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011.

end quotes from Prof Brook at the link above.

It is one think to make a mistake of omission. It is one thing to determine that tsunami could safely be set at 6.5 metres maximum wave height if in fact no evidence for the historic presence of tsunamis of greater height existed. What does the record show? Does evidence that tsunami wave height along the Fukushima coastline greater – much greater – than 6.5 metres exist? Was the evidence presented to Japanese government, radiological and energy generators such as TEPCO? If so, when did this occur and how did the Japanese authorities respond?
Should alleged and self proclaimed tsunami experts such as Barry Brook have also have had the foresight and responsibility to know about this potential evidence prior to the issuing of his edicts?

Let us see. Japanese written history goes back a long long time. Ample opportunity for nuclear authorities in Japan and elsewhere to learn from history, as Brook claims they did prior to designing the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear complex and its tsunami defences.

As mentioned above, the following is taken from “Fukushima – Japan’s Tsunami and the inside story of the nuclear meltdowns”, by Mark Willacy, 9781742612959, MacMillan by Pan MacMillan Australia Pty Ltd. Copyright Mark Willacy 2013. In the following extracts for study purposes, all quotes are from this book. I give the page numbers at the end of each quote.

“…Dr. Gavin Hayes, a geophysicist with the United States Geological Survey in Denver, Colorado …(stated) “We equate it (the events of March 2011) most closely with the Jogan Earthquake of 869″. Named for that period of Japanese history, the Jogan Earthquake sent a tsunami crashing into the Sanriku coast. It’s impact was described in Nihon Sandai Jitsuroku (The True History of Three Regions of Japan), an official history of Japan ordered by the Emperor Uda in 879 CE and completed 22 years later. It recorded how more than 1,000 people perished…” Willacy, pp 25, 26.

“Dr.Yukinobu Okamura, the director of Japan’s Active Fault and Earthquake Researxh Centre ….. Dr. Okamura’s researchers had already discovered four years earlier (to 2011) through sediment analysis that the Jogan tsunami had reached three to four kilometres inland in modern day Sendai and nearly two kilometres inland at northern Fukushima. That finding would come back to haunt him, the Japanese Government and TEPCO, the operator of the Fukushima Diiachi Nuclear Plant”. Willacy, pp26. emphasis added.

“In 2008, TEPCO engineers made a startling discovery. Using simulations, they calculated that a tsunami as high as 15.7 metres could slam into the Fukushima Diiachi Nuclear Plant. But TEPCO’s top brass, including the deputy head of the nuclear division, Sakae Muto, shelved the findings….TEPCO would keep the 15.7 metre tsunami simulation a secret from nuclear regulators until 7 March 2011 – four days before waves as high as 15 metres slammed into Fukushima Diiachi….” Willacy, pp 96.

“On 24 June 2009, during a meeting of the NISA panel set up (in 2008) to review nuclear reactor plant safeguards, Yukinobu Okamura (see earlier quote above) warned everyone that there was a risk of a huge tsunami barrelling into the Fukushima coast, right where the Fukushima Diiachi plant sat. He based his warning on beach sand and sea-floor deposits washed inland near the site 1,140 years earlier, in the minutes after the Jogan earthquake. ….”Dr. Okamura explained…”We had researched much before the March 11 earthquake and so we set out the scale of the 869 quake.”…”We proved that a tsunami of (such a large) scale had occurred.”….”We found deposits from tsunamis that were older than the Jogan tsunami, Dr. Okamura said. “We measured the time and then estimated the frequency. Then we discovered that the intervals (between the tsunamis) are 500 to 800 years. That means if no quake had hit since the Jogan (tremor), then the probability of (another large earthquake) was high. dThe is, I felt it was high time…..Yukinobu Okamura took his research to the NISA panel and presented it to his colleagues, warning them that big tsunamis had hit the Fukushima coast before, and that the 1938 earthquake that TEPCO was using as a benchmark for safety at the nuclear plant was inadequate because it was way too small….Sitting across the table from Dr. Okamura in his office in the Active Fault and Earthquake Research Centre, north east of Tokyo in 2012, I asked him exactly what he told his colleagues on the expert panel in June 2009. This sparked a testy exchange with his two (government) minders – Shimomura and Tanaka. “That is not related to his business,” snapped Tanaka” Willacy, pp 99, 100, 101.

Willacy explains that the minutes from the meetings were freely available from NISA, and that he (Willacy) had already obtained them and read them) (it is important in current rebuttal of the Brook view to quote the relevant minutes fairly comprehensively, so that we can determine how nuclear authorities respond to reality – was it in a manner which indicates that wanted to act on lessons learned for the benefit of all, or rather, did they want to contest it or bury it by bullying and suppressing the expert evidence? Copyright and very original work by Mark Willacy deserves a referral to his work rather than comprehensive copying of his work here though. Get the book.

The record of the minutes in Willacy’s book clearly shows that the TEPCO representative present, Mr. Nishimura contented that the Jogan earthquake did not cause much damage. Dr. Okamura disagreed citing the historical record. However it is plain that TEPCO was concerned to keep the discussion focussed only earthquake damage as opposed to tsunami damage. Pointedly, the following exchange took place:

“Mr. Nishimura from TEPCO then said he thought that maybe the company should look into the Jogan Earthquake. Dr. Okamura went on to explain that his team’s research had already found deposits left by the Jogan tsunami deep inland, and that, contrary to TEPCO’s view, massive waves did indeed slam into the coast as far south as Fukushima. “That information is available to us. But you are not mentioning it all. That is what I can’t understand, said Okamura to the TEPCO official….A week later, the expert panel’s interim report was issued. It was noted that Dr. Okamura had requested that the Jogan Earthquake of 869 be studied. But then it rebuffed everything the geologist had warned about – that these giant quakes strike off the Pacific coast every 500 to 800 years, that they spawn massive tsunamis that can thunder kilometres inland, and that there is proof written in the earth itself to back all this up. Instead, the interim report stated that NISA did not think the Jogan tremor was as violent or devastating as the demonstrably smaller 1938 earthquake used as TEPCO’s safety benchmark for the nuclear plant at Fukushima…Yukinobu Okamura’s expert but dissenting opinion was dismissed. But his warnings that TEPCO’s defences at Fukushima Diiachi were woefully inadequate would prove prophetic, …..” Willacy pp 99, 100, 101.

i find that Barry Brook’s portrayal of nuclear industry doing all it could to reasonably anticipate and design appropriately for the tsunami hazard at Fukushima Diiachi is deeply and seriously in error. I cannot say whether these serious errors in accurate disclosure are deliberate or not. As a person who claims expert knowledge in all things he talks about, I find him totally unacceptable as a rigorous source of impartial and accurate information. Suffice to say since 2009 at the latest Japanese nuclear experts had sufficient warning to adequately prepare for the events of March 2011. Not only did these experts fail to so prepare, they actively suppressed the truth until a mere 7 days before the tsunami struck in March 2011. The nuclear industry, as per usual, failed to respond to reality in a rational manner. It was, as usual, more interested in PR and profits. These are my opinions based upon the fantasies of Prof Brook and the facts presented by Japanese experts as reported by Mark Willacy.

The Barry Brook Position in the light of Ergen – Enforced Amnesia or Ignorance ?

this post is undergoing editing. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30026010

Preamble

The public response to the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster was and remains strongly negative. At core is the question “At what level of radiological exposure should the public be concerned?” The question has at it’s heart the concept of involuntary and compulsory imposition of increased risk. Nuclear experts have long pondered how to respond to such concerns of ordinary people: quote: >“When is a radiation dose high enough to be a “public health concern?” This, of course, is a question that the radiation safety community has been trying to answer for decades. Over 20 y of working with the public on radiation issues strongly indicates to me that many, if not most, members of the public have answered this question for themselves: Any amount of radiation that is not of direct benefit to me will result in harm to me or my children. The National Academy of Sciences has most recently concluded that use of the linear no-threshold (LNT) hypothesis to describe the relationship between radiation dose and the risk of developing cancer in humans is consistent with current scientific evidence (NRCNA 2006). The public believes that this is a fact, not a hypothesis. If we, the radiation safety and public health communities, agree with this statement, then any dose above background could be considered a dose of “public health concern.” Of course, the proper use of the LNT hypothesis is subject to considerable discussion (Siegel and Stabin 2012).

EPA chose to use a small fraction of the PAG in the Fukushima incident as a level of no “public health concern.” Was that an appropriate use of this phrase? The Health Physics Society has issued a position statement that below a dose of 50–100 mSv, the “risks of health effects are either too small to be observed or are nonexistent” (HPS 2010). Is this a place to begin defining a dose of no “public health concern” for emergency response purposes?

Clearly, this question is not going to be answered easily or quickly. Source: Charles W. Miller, Radiation Studies Branch, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30341; IN : “THE FUKUSHIMA RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED FOR FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES”, Health Phys. 2012 May; 102(5): 584–588.
doi: 10.1097/HP.0b013e31824d0241. end quote

There will always be tension between radiological safety measures, including exposure limits to the public, which permit nuclear industry to exist, nuclear safety experts, most of whom work to ensure industry complies with relevant laws including exposure limits to the public and the general public itself. Indeed, some members of the public have a zero tolerance of industrial radiation exposures when such exposures are suffered by the general public.

Nuclear safety experts have, as Miller points out above, discussed the problem for decades. It is useless, given the entrenched nature between the concept of “nuclear safety” in the context of low level industrial contamination, for nuclear advocates to complain about the expressed views of people who refuse to give consent or to accept industry and government have any right to actually inflict nuclear contamination upon the human living and the world’s biosphere. It is quite useless. It is useful however for nuclear experts to engage honestly and sincerely with the public. The behaviour of the industry, government and pro nuclear lobbyists has been variable – from appalling to atrocious. And that includes the published and broadcast statements of one Barry Brook. In my opinion.

One cause of specific global outrage in the wake of Fukushima was, to quote:
The post facto raising of safety limits for radiation exposure on 19 April 2011 (from 1 to 20mSv) and reduction of the evacuation zone to
less than 30 km from the NPP,
driven by an unapologetic ‘logic’ of optimal growth, ignored the passage of radioactive concentrations beyond the official concentric circles emanating from the crippled plant. These were to denote the 20km mandatory exclusion zone (greater than 50mSv) and the 30km voluntary exclusion zone (20-50mSv).”
end quote. Source: Adam Broinowski, “Fukushima: Life and the Transnationality of Radioactive
Contamination 生命と国境を越える放射能汚染” The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus, Volume 11 | Issue 41 | Number 3 | Oct 13, 2013. pp 5.

ICRP Publication 82, entitled “Protection of the Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation Exposure”, dated 1999, states: “This report provides guidance on the application of the ICRP system of radiological protection to prolonged exposure situations effecting members of the public. It addresses the general application of the Commission’s system to the control of prolonged exposures resulting from practices and to the undertaking of interventions in prolonged exposure situations…..Generic reference levels for intervention, in terms of existing total annual doses, are given as <~100 mSv, above which intervention is almost always justifiable (situations for which the annual dose threshold for deterministic effects in relevant organs is exceeded will almost always require intervention), and <~10 mSv, below which intervention is not likely to be justifiable (and above which it may be necessary)….." end quote. Source: ICRP, 1999. Protection of the Public in Situations of Prolonged Radiation Exposure. ICRP Publication 82. Ann. ICRP 29 (1-2) at http://www.icrp.org/publication.asp?id=ICRP%20Publication%2082 . Of course, Australians who followed the cleanup of the Maralinga Nuclear Test site, and others who were aware, prior to 1999, of the ICRP move to recommend the <100mSv regime for which no intervention would be required. This was clearly explained by the Maralinga Technical Advisory Group (TAG) and by Peter Burns, then a senior technical leader with ARPANSA (since retired). Burns' report "Maralinga", quoting, TAG, states in part: "The aim of the Maralinga rehabilitation was to ensure that the risk to potential inhabitants from exposure to radioactive contamination would be acceptable. The dividing line between acceptability and unacceptability of risk [TAG, 1990] was determined to be an annual committed dose of 5 mSv, assuming full time occupancy by Aborigines living an outstation lifestyle. This corresponds to an annual risk of fatal cancer following the inhalation or ingestion of contaminated soil of not more than 1 in 10,000 by the fiftieth year of life [Technical Advisory Group, TAG, 1990]. The value of 5 mSv is broadly consistent with the intervention level of 10 mSv that has recently been proposed by the International Commission on Radiological Protection [§6.1 in ICRP, 1999] and which is under consideration by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA, 2002]. Both of these international bodies are proposing that, in future, a generic reference level of around 10 mSv be set, under which intervention is generally not justified." (Burns, ARPANSA, TAG) Here, the imposed risk of fatal cancer due to the exposure is clearly given, in a matter of fact fashion. An annual committed dose of 5 mSv imposes a risk of 1 in 10,000 by the fiftieth year of life for a person. Brook may well huff and puff at ARPANSA's alleged radiophobia in so giving a discussion and prediction of risk and harm (as implied by the risk over time) but Brook is a Kangaroo expert, not an expert in health physics. Others may say ARPANSA is grossly under estimating the risk. This is the same old debate which has been going on since Madame Curie was a child and the matter remains unresolved. See Miller's discussion above. People such as Brook (then of Adelaide Uni) and Sykes of Flinders Uni and others, who, along with Sykes are paid contractors of the US Department of Energy, charged with promoting the work of that foreign government agency have actually no basis for attempting to halt public debate by intimidation based upon throwing insults at ordinary members of the public in a democracy. For example: https://news.flinders.edu.au/blog/2011/07/14/radiation-response-a-meltdown-in-reason/ by Sykes. 1 in 10,000 over fifty years is way too high when the added risk in an uncontaminated environment would be zero Sykes. Brook is quite upset by people who maintain that the Japanese increase to the non intervention level in Japan from 1 mSv to 20mSv is not risk free. The fact is members of the public in Japan are totally free, or should be, to be unhappy about the state of the environment due to the Fukushima Diiachi disaster.

In terms of the Australian context, the importance of Fukushima Diiachi relates to the long standing debate, which pre dates 2011, about what our future source of electricity should be. We are in an energy transition cusp which may well last for 20 years. During that time we need new sources of power generation and the choices are limited. A nuclear reactor would take 20 years to come on line, we would need two. By the time the reactors were built, they would not be needed. Two coal fired power plants could be on line much more quickly but coal is out of fashion. To say the least. Renewable energy storage is not quite mature. We await the new generation of lithium battery to ensure renewable energy from wind and solar photovoltaic can be stored safely and reliably for use when needed. As it is we will need coal fired stations for 20 years. Further, as we shall see, the state of the grid in Australia fails to meet the stringent requirements nuclear licensing and technical requirements demand. If the wind can bring down high voltage pylons in SA – which they have done recently – what does that say about the safety of any NPP in Australia in terms of station blackout? And yes, in Japan, the earthquake caused the main grid both fed by and feeding Fukushima Diiachi to go down. The quake caused reactors to shut down, the grid blacked out AND power lines feeding Fukushima Diiachi were destroyed. These quake based factors have been ignored in the industry narrative of the Fukushima Disaster. Indeed the constant industry refrain that the public is too ignorant to understand that the industry is innocent and honest and messengers of the whole truth is merely an old song which makes a ribald sea shanty seem like high opera in contrast.

The fact is had Japan not radically increased the risk by changed exposure rules post Fukushima, though still based on ICRP quidelines, the nation may well have been financially crippled for decades. As it is the costs of the accident will continue to be levied from the public for many years to come. Japan has lost more home island land due to 4 nuclear reactors than it did from the Allied forces in WW2. The contamination of areas in Japan from 2011 on has imposed heightened risk upon select populations living in Japan. At a contamination level of 5 mSv, the risk is 1 in 10,000 over fifty years. Source: ARPANSA. At least. At that brings me to my last point in this pre amble: On the 15th of March 2011, the words of the Chief Scientist of Britain, Lord Beddington, were transmitted and streamed around the world by the BBC. I watched him speak on local TV in Adelaide. If there were a meltdown, he said, “you would get an explosion and radioactive material would be emitted. But it would be emitted to about 500 meters and it would be a relatively short duration of the order of an hour or so. Compare that with Chernobyl…” (BBC material rebroadcast by SBS TV Australia, 15 March 2011.) Well Beddington was imo deliberately incorrect. Further, in order to gain some insight into the newly imposed risk suffered by the Japanese people, looking at Chernobyl was very advice for an Australian to follow. Maralinga, its cleanup, and its imposed risk, deemed acceptable by authorities, and the best the owners of the land could hope if they were ever to get their land back, is a far plainer and easier to understand example than Chernobyl. Even though the Maralinga cleanup was a cock up, we have some official odds, some official degree of risk over time resultant from dose. 1 in 10,000 is an extra imposed burden. 1 in 10,000 means someone gets a fatal cancer every fifty years in each afflicted population. Now, that figure might well be wrong. It may be optimistic or pessimistic. Who knows. But there is a risk and the general public is allowed to know about that risk and precisely what it means. And we are free to talk about it among ourselves without the industry having right to try to shut us up with insults and threats of legal action. Barry.

Research into the medical effects of low dose radiation exposure extends back many decades. One recent paper is : “Leukaemia and myeloid malignancy among people exposed to low doses (<100 mSv) of ionising radiation during childhood: a pooled analysis of nine historical cohort studies."
Little MP1, Wakeford R2, Borrego D3, French B4, Zablotska LB5, Adams MJ6, Allodji R7, de Vathaire F7, Lee C3, Brenner AV3, Miller JS8, Campbell D8, Pearce MS9, Doody MM3, Holmberg E10, Lundell M11, Sadetzki S12, Linet MS3, Berrington de González A3.
Lancet Haematol. 2018 Aug;5(8):e346-e358.

This paper states the following: “BACKGROUND:
Substantial evidence links exposure to moderate or high doses of ionising radiation, particularly in childhood, with increased risk of leukaemia. The association of leukaemia with exposure to low-dose (<100 mSv) radiation is less certain, although this is the dose range most relevant to the general population. We aimed to estimate the risk of leukaemia associated with low-dose radiation exposure in childhood (age <21 years)……The risks of acute myeloid leukaemia and acute lymphoblastic leukaemia were significantly increased after cumulative doses of ionising radiation of less than 100 mSv in childhood or adolescence, with an excess risk also apparent for cumulative radiation doses of less than 50 mSv for some endpoints. These findings support an increased risk of leukaemia associated with low-dose exposure to radiation and imply that the current system of radiological protection is prudent and not overly protective.”

FUNDING:
National Cancer Institute Intramural Research Program, National Cancer Institute, and US National Institutes for Health. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

end quote. Again, far from the cry that public concern about both the post 1999 ICRP action level recommendations and the consequences of the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster are mere signs of mass mental illness and phobia, the record is replete with findings which indicate that risk is proportionate to dose. And that even at both prolonged and acute exposures of “less than 50mSv” risk remains proportionate. Therefore public concern at environmental contamination from the activities of nuclear industry remains an a rational and adaptive concern. This flies in the face of the rosy reassurances issued by quite ignorant kangaroo experts such as Prof Barry Brook and Prof Pam Sykes.

For me, the ARPANSA/ TAG risk assessment of Maralinga, being in the same ball park as the prolonged exposures suffered by the Japanese people impacted by the meltdown and explosions of 4 nuclear reactors. And to my mind the authority of ARPANSA (such as it is in the public mind) enables me to quote that source : Prolonged exposure to contamination of 5 mSv pa over fifty years yields a risk of fatal cancer of 1 in 10,000. Brook and Sykes are wrong and I believe they or their advisors / trainers / propagandists knew their information was incorrect when these people and others commandeered the media and made their lunatic edicts from 2011 through to the recent South Australian Royal Commission in the SA nuclear fuel cycle. The end result of the industry campaign to hood wink South Australians is to render the statements made by talking heads such as Brook, Sykes and Baht laughing stocks when their crap is compared to the scientific record. I can understand Brook feeling glum enough to threaten ordinary people with legal action for their robust disagreement with him and his statements. Still, his TV interview linked to below allows him to have another go at appearing reasonable and democratic.

In further rebuttal to the nuclear industry advocate view that the Japanese public has no basis for public health concerns as a consequence of the Fukushima Diiachi disaster I report the following:

A US based professional nuclear decontamination expert names Dr. David Chanin contacted me to discuss his views on events related to the Fukushima Diiachi disaster. He and I exchanged emails. Here is some information about Dr. Chanin and some of the things he wrote to me:

David Chanin co-authored, among other things, the following publications :

“MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) Model Description”
NUREG/CR-4691, SAND86-1562, Prepared by H-N Jow, J. L. Sprung, J. A. Rollstin, L. T. Ritchie, D.I. Chanin,
Sandia National Laboratories, Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ManuscriptCompleted:
December 1989 Date Published: February 1990.
87185 GRAM, Inc.Albuquerque, NM Technadyne Engineering Consultants, Inc. Albuquerque, NM Prepared for
Division of Systems Research Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555 NRC FIN A1853, Prepared for Division of Systems Research Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 NRC FIN A1853
Available at: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0635/ML063560409.pdf
and
“PWA 00004 Pilgrim LR Proceeding 50-293 – LR, 06-848-02-LR PWA- David Chanin: MACCS2 Support Forum & The Development of MACCS2: Lessons Learned, August 23, 2006 RE: MACCS2 Economic Costs” Available at:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1100/ML110030906.pdf
In 2011 and 2012 David Chanin and I exchanged emails in regard to the consequences of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.
In response to a question David Chanin responded with the following:
David Chanin To Paul Langley16 Jul 2011
“I think we’ll never know the truth about what’s happening there.”
—– Original Message —–
From: paul langley
To: David Chanin
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2011 9:21 AM
Subject: Decontamination in Fukushima
David, has there been any progress or good news regarding decontamination of Fukushima City itself?
Regards
Paul Langley

David Chanin also wrote the following:
— On Fri, 22/4/11, David Chanin wrote:
From: David Chanin
Subject: hey, here’s another favor you can do me
To: “paul langley”
Received: Friday, 22 April, 2011, 1:45 AM

Paul

What’s amazing to me is that I seem to be the only one who thinks that I-131 levels should be decreasing with 8-day halflife because its only parents in the “standard NRC 60-nuclide list for reactors” are Te-131and Te-131m, both with shorter halflives, so they can’t be causing any I-131 buildup and certainly can’t cause the high levels of I-131 being reported in the flood of measurements that were published by TEPCO all on April 19, with measurements of seawater as far away as 15 km showing I:Cs rations of over 2:1 and as high as 3:1, but sometimes they’re equal, with few to none where I-131 is measured at levels less than Cs-134 and Cs-137 on a Bq/gram-water basis with 1000-second counting time of 1-liter sample, which matches up with usage of a gamma spectrometry machine like the GAM-AN1 by Canberra: http://www.canberra.com/literature/994.asp

Can you do me a favor and ask one of your nuclear engineer contacts how and why I-131 can be over double the reported levels of Cs-134 and Cs-137, after five halflives of I-131?

I’m not a nuclear engineer who can try to run the Origen code for their reactors and the SNF pools to see what could be making the I-131. I’m the consequence analyst who developed the MACCS2 code and have used it and its predecessor MACCS since the 1980s for nuclear accident analysis.

All I know is that when people use the MACCS2 code, which is the NRC-approved code for reactor PRA consequence calculations, and is used worldwide for well over 500 nuclear facilities and operations since its release in 1997, the MACCS2 code shows ZERO consequences from I-131 from reactor accidents after 40 days of decay. It’s not just the direct exposure doses from groundshine and inhalation, it’s also the food doses calculated by the code with both of the “food models” that are available to the code user. Milk from cows grazing during a large release shows very low levels of I-131 after 40 days according to the MACCS2 calculations.

And it’s also my understanding that “normal levels” of I-131 in SNF pools should be practically zero, with the million-year, weak emitter, I-129 being the only iodine that should be detected to any significant degree in SNF water from an intact pool under normal operation. So, if my MACCS2 code is wrong about I-131, then all the safety analyses that use to MACCS2 to calculate nuclear accident impacts are also wrong. That’s why this is an important question.

Even if criticalities are ongoing, it’s impossible for me to imagine that they could be creating so much I-131. I’ve used “standard decay tables” that all derive from ICRP 38 and were calculated by Keith Eckerman, at ORNL, who calculates the internal and external DCFs for US and international agencies which all rely on the ICRP 38 decay chains, where decay-chain calcs are necessary because of the decay and buildup of progeny after an intake both on the ground for deposited material and in the human body from inhlaed or ingested material.

I have not tried to use this database from KfK to solve the puzzle.: http://www.nucleonica.net/unc.aspx

So my question, which you can forward around with all the above ane below is: Why are the I-131 levels of April 19 in “plant-water” and seawater from http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html so high after 5 halflives? The NRC says that the MACCS2 code is essentially error-free. I’m curious if that’s true because I learned way back in school that there is no such thing a bug-free large-scale software such as MACCS2, which has received little-to-none verification and validation for complex scenarios.

I have no qualms whatsoever being known as the source of this request. I’ve never pretended to know everything.

David Chanin

David Chanin also wrote the following:

“I haven’t read your blog going back past a week or so. The only reason i posted there was that it seemed like a safe enough place to post my newly formed opinion about the Japanese being used as human guninea pigs for the second time … but now by their own government. There are plenty of competent CHPs in Japan who can read and write good English. Unfortunately, competent CHPs seem to have no involvement with the events of Fukushima. The flood of garbled information with nonsense numbers coming from people driving cars around with a single pen dosimeter to take a “dose reading” is tragically funny. You’re right about ignoring the inhalation intakes. They might not know that the inhalation pathway is more important than “groundshine.” But that’s Radiation Safety 101. Every nuclear engineer in the world should know that or have it on their bookshelf. Tis a mystery. Maybe the US NRC told them they didn’t have to worry about inhalation as long as they wore face masks. But then what about analyzing their nasal swabs? Never mind. The labs are full. No need to worry. It’s perfectly safe. Time will tell … Meantime we get to do a huge experiment to see if low doses and low dose rates actually can cause any cancers other than childhood thyroid cancers. Isn’t that grand?” David Chanin 2011.
When a nuclear decontamination expert communicates the concerns expressed above, people need to sit up and take notice. While my opinions deviate from those held by Dr. Chanin, both Dr. Chanin and I share one thing: to understand the relevant situation as well as we can. No contest Dr. Chanin is in a far better position in this regard than I am. However, when I compare the views of Dr. Chanin with the views, expressed as non negotiable alleged facts, by Barry Brook, Pam Sykes and Dr. Baht, I see no unity of opinion and knowledge. In the case of Brook and co I see remarkable lack of knowledge and gross technical errors. I see a very negative characterisation of the wisdom of the general public and an arrogant dismissal of the rights of the general public to hold both specific knowledge and opinions and the right to express these opinions. The tension between the academic claim to intellectual pre-eminence and the rights of individual lay people in democratic societies is certainly very great in the nuclear debate. Happily it is quite easy to rebut Brooks, Sykes and Baht. None of these will be remembered as significant knowledge workers in the future history of Australia’s energy generation regime. In my opinion.

The Aim of this post is to present the mass media statements of knowledge and opinion given by Prof. Barry Brook.
(http://www.utas.edu.au/profiles/staff/plant-science/barry-brook)

Prof. Brook has presented the pro-nuclear environmentalist case for a number of years. I was and remain particularly interested in his public level presentations regarding the nuclear accident at Fukushima Diiachi in March 2011.

A primary objective of this post is to determine whether or not the information transmitted to the public by Prof. Brooks contains sufficient technical knowledge. Particularly in both the contexts of current best practice and historical levels of knowledge. Specifically regarding the criteria for the safe design of multi- mega-watt nuclear reactors. Given that nuclear reactors have long working lives, historic and current technical knowledge are both relevant, as are regulatory updates and technical modifications. Indeed, the US NRC mandated changes in procedures and equipment at relevant US nuclear reactor sites throughout the USA in the wake of Fukushima.

I certainly do not question anyone’s right and ability to express their knowledge and opinions to the public. I rely on an open and democratic society in precisely the same manner as everyone else. Prof. Brook has of course the same right. In my personal opinion, academic meritocracy exists within a field of tension within democratic society. Thus, I believe I have equal rights to express my knowledge and opinions both with, and indeed, in tension to any qualified academic. And certainly studying Prof. Brook’s public statements via the mass media will be an exciting one for me, perhaps a boring one for him, should he notice. However, my aim is to assess, not attack, the public statements of Prof. Brook. Certainly if Prof. Brook has reason to complain, I will certainly listen and respond to what he might object to. I shall try to ensure that he has no reason to complain.

Qualifications

Prof. Barry Brook:
http://www.utas.edu.au/profiles/staff/plant-science/barry-brook

I refer to the following public media statements made by Prof. Barry Brook:

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-16/brook—fukushima2c-nuclear-power-and-the-rational-approach-to/3733762

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo The following is a partial transcript of the words spoken by Prof. Barry Brook in the video. I have not transcribed the questions put to Prof. Brook by the interviewer, please watch the entire video. The section I chose to transcribe (this is my own transcription, please check the video) highlights the profound lacking inherent in the nuclear industry narrative regarding key events and key standards which are as inherent in modern reactor designs as they are in the old Fukushima type reactors. The most important of these lacking revolve around a failure to admit to the very well documented “ECCS Controversy” which remains today, the regulations regarding NPPs and the grid, the risks posed by a failed grid to NPPS, the regulations which stipulate the performance parameters of the ECCS of all nuclear reactors, which remain basically the same now as they were then. Prof Brook makes a statement that the emergency cooling water was damaged by the tsunami. In a section below devoted to the power grid, the power grid and meltdown, the Ergen report into ECCS, and the US NRC short history of emergency core cooling and ECCS design, I shall show that the statement made by Barry Brook comparing the old Fukushima Diiachi reactors ends with an incorrect conclusion. In my opinion, based upon the qualified texts quoted.

Partial transcript:

Regarding events involving Japan and Fukushima:

Prof. Brook: “I think they (events) show the vulnerability of any human infrastructure to the forces of nature. Especially when they are unleashed with such fury as they were with that massive earthquake, the largest one to hit Japan in recorded times, and a 10 metre tsunami. I don’t think it’s reasonable to expect any infrastructure along a coastline like that to survive an event like that. But what it does highlight is that decisions were made back in the ‘60s, when that nuclear power plant was planned and built, they did not anticipate the scale of the natural disaster that occurred here.”

On the relevance of the design of the Fukushima Diiachi type NPP to today’s modern reactors and to future stations :

Prof Brook: “These are amongst the oldest nuclear power plants in Japan. And they put them on the coastline for the sensible reason that they can use seawater to cool them. And it’s part of the design that they were protected not only against earthquake by seismic isolating the plant itself, but by tsunamis. They predicted up to a 6.5 metres tsunami and protected against that. But of course, as events turned out, the tsunami was even bigger than that. The tsunami washed over the plant. It seems like it damaged the diesel generators that were supplying backup power . There was a chain of diesel generators in fact, each one a redundant generator for the one before it. All of those were destroyed by the tsunami. The fuel tanks that would supply the diesel for many days for them seemed to be washed away. And the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it. The design of the 40 year old plant actually survived the earthquake. They were designed to survive an earthquake 7 times that what they were hit by and yet they survived and it was the tsunami that got them.”

It’s not beyond the wit of engineers to plan plants survive better?

Prof Brooke: “I think it’s clear that the risk that the tsunami faced and the fact that all of the redundant generators were wiped out in one blow suggests that there was not enough prudent forethought for that risk. And in any sort of major accident in any industry there’s a period of introspection afterwards. Looking at what went wrong. Just like in anything in our lives. And trying to take the salient lessons and use that in future is a …I see the announcements of governments around the world to re-look at the safety of their current nuclear power plants. That’s an eminently sensible thing to do because you can look at all of the contingencies that they have allowed for and say well, what if the situation in Japan had happened to us, are we prepared? That’s learning from the lessons of history.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011

These two references will suffice. Many other references to Prof. Brook’s public media contributions exist online and are easy to find. Please read the contents and listen to the video at the above links before continuing to read this post.

The account Prof. Brook gives of the nuclear accident at Fukushima and the consequences of it is very conventional when compared with other accounts from nuclear industry experts. Barry mentions relative risk compared to other forms of power generation, the chemical pollution unleashed upon Japan as a result of the March 2011 disaster, the age of the Fukushima power plants, the apparent resilience of the aged plant and equipment in the face of earthquake, the unexpected height of the tsunami which swamped the plant and particularly the emergency power generators which were destroyed by the wave. Barry is of the view that the people at risk from the high risks of high radiation doses were the plant workers: that the risk to the general population in the immediate vicinity of the plant (say 30 kms) was not and is not, a matter of significant concern.
A study of relevant US nuclear authority (AEC and NRC) documents reveals that current and past regulations maintain a close relationship to each other. The safety challenges posed by nuclear power plants demanded from the beginning complex and comprehensive regulations based upon the findings of science. The early studies into a primary safety concern – preventing core overheating – remain relevant today. Today’s knowledge and regulations does nothing to diminish the regulations the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear plants were built to comply with. Centrally, the operating life time of the late sixties era Emergency Core Cooling systems built into the Fukushima Diiachi had to ensure that when lack of grid power and loss of normal cooling loops occurred the reactor cores would not overheat.

This remains true today of every Western nuclear reactor. The ECCS is built into every reactor and the promise of industry has been no matter force of nature or human stupidity causes loss of primary cooling, the ECCS will ensure that the core does not overheat.

Thus, the question millions of people have in the wake of Fukushima Diiachi, is this: given that the multiple integral ECCS systems built within each of the three afflicted Fukushima Diiachi reactors, failed to prevent overheating, hydrogen production, explosions and core over heat, can we be sure that any ECCS system fitted to any nuclear reactor will work as promised. What is the solution to the patently obvious failure of multiple ECCS systems ? Is the solution? Some say the solution is simple in Australia. Simply do not commence to build nuclear reactors here.

A REBUTTAL OF THE PROF. BROOK POSITION

This post has been edited. Please see the pre amble for a rebuttal of the Brook position regarding public safety in parts of Japan post the Fukushima Diiachi disaster.

Baseload Power, the Grid, Nuclear Reactors and Renewables

According to nuclear industry, the concept of Baseload Power via an electrical grid is a basic requirement of modern societies. According to this view robust national grids fed by multiple high capacity continuous generators is mandatory.

Australia and South Australia certainly is in an energy technology transition. We are in a cusp and are vulnerable as a state and as a nation as a result.

The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has released a report which studies the causes of the 28 September 2016 state wide black out which the state of South Australia suffered on that day. The full report is available here:
https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/Files/Electricity/NEM/Market_Notices_and_Events/Power_System_Incident_Reports/2017/Integrated-Final-Report-SA-Black-System-28-September-2016.pdf

“The report states: “As the generation mix continues to change across the NEM, it is no longer appropriate to rely solely on synchronous generators to provide essential non-energy system services (such as voltage control, frequency control, inertia, and system strength). Instead, additional means of procuring these services must be considered, from non-synchronous generators (where it is technically feasible), or from network or non-network services (such as demand response and synchronous condensers).” (AEMO, page 5). NEM means National Energy Market.

Please note the text I have highlighted in bold. Synchronous generators such as coal fired baseload, nuclear baseload and hydro baseload are, clearly, in the findings of the AEMO report, NO LONGER APPROPRIATE to rely upon for the essential grid services defined by AEMO.

Thus AEMO is able to state that: “AEMO has also begun work with the Australian Renewable Energy Authority (ARENA) and others on proof-of-concept trials of promising new technologies, starting with use of the new Hornsdale Stage 2
wind farm to provide grid stabilisation services. These projects can deliver engineering solutions to make the grid more resilient and protect customer supply as the transformation of Australia’s energy system continues.
(AEMO, page 5).

If nuclear power were actually the only means by which Australia could stabilise voltage, frequency, load capacity, phase alignment and so on, and still mean Australian carbon emissions targets, surely AEMO, as an independent expert body would have reported as much.

Which is not to say Nuclear power plants could not technically replace the Australian coal fired generator fleet. Obviously NPPs could have a role. The fact is that they don’t have a role in Australia’s national energy and happily never have had such a role.

South Australia has always had a shaky state grid. The stability of the state grid in terms of voltage spikes, phase accuracy and alignment and so on caused HiFi enthusiasts to complain about about the technically ‘dirty” Adelaide electrical supply from the time I was a teenager. A Linn hifi system (a very sensitive and expensive system) sounded “like crap” in Adelaide whereas the very same hifi system moved and set up in Sydney sounded the way it should. Many experts put it down to SA’s small coal fired generators being actually unable to maintain a stable grid in all parameters. It has been a long term problem here.

With the advent of the national energy market, the South Australian grid’s inter connector with the East States’ coal fired power stations became critical. The inter-connector became even more critical with the closure of the coal fired power station at Port Augusta in South Australia’s mid north area. The closure of that station was long overdue. Original designed to burn eastern seaboard high grade black coal, various supply threats induced the SA government in the 1950s to instruct that only local low grade brown coal be burnt. This has had specifically very negative health effects on people living near and down wind of that now closed power plant. The late former Mayor of Port Augusta spent years trying unsuccessfully to induce the government to improve the emissions filters on the old power plant to little result. The late Mayor blamed the area’s high rate of lung cancer squarely on the emissions from the old coal fired plant. Here is an article about the issue from 8 years ago: https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/port-augusta-is-sas-cancer-hotspot/news-story/d2ed7532527bf669df9666b933dc7cd9 I have reported this previously. I agree with the late former mayor, and disagree with then Minister Hill. The cause of the lung cancer rate in the town was the power plant. Other surveys found the smoking rate of the residents was no different to the rest of the state. These are the facts as I see them. It is rational to think that burning coal which was closer to bitumen than proper high grade black coal would and did cause a public health disaster in the environs of the old Port Augusta power plant. The recent clouds of ash from the unmitigated fly ash dump at the old power plant, which blew all over the city of Port Augusta shows how trust worthy private industry and governments actually are when it comes to matters of public health risks in the context of the social good of electrical power. Individuals come off third best. Corporations have their PR and their actual reality. So does government. PR = bullshit. imo.

Turning back to the AEMO report in the 2016 state wide blackout, we need to look at what factors actually caused the blackout:

Here’s a fair slab taken straight from the AEMO report:

“On Wednesday 28 September 2016, tornadoes with wind speeds in the range of 190–260 km/h occurred in areas of South Australia.1 Two tornadoes almost simultaneously damaged a single circuit 275 kilovolt (kV) transmission line and a double circuit 275 kV transmission line, some 170 km apart.

The damage to these three transmission lines caused them to trip, and a sequence of faults in quick succession resulted in six voltage dips on the SA grid over a two-minute period at around 4.16 pm.

As the number of faults on the transmission network grew, nine wind farms in the mid-north of SA exhibited a sustained reduction in power as a protection feature activated. For eight of these wind farms, the protection settings of their wind turbines allowed them to withstand a pre-set number of voltage dips within a two-minute period. Activation of this protection feature resulted in a significant sustained power reduction for these wind farms. A sustained generation reduction of 456 megawatts (MW) occurred over a period of less than seven seconds. The reduction in wind farm output caused a significant increase in imported power flowing through the Heywood Inter-connector. Approximately 700 milliseconds (ms) after the reduction of output from the last of the wind farms, the flow on the Victoria–SA Heywood Inter-connector reached such a level that it
activated a special protection scheme that tripped the interconnector offline.

The SA power system then became separated (“islanded”) from the rest of the NEM. Without any substantial load shedding following the system separation, the remaining generation was much less than the connected load and unable to maintain the islanded system frequency. As a result, all supply
to the SA region was lost at 4.18 pm (the Black System).3F 4 AEMO’s analysis shows that following system separation, frequency collapse and the consequent Black System was inevitable.” (AEMO, page 6) emphasis added.

South Australia is a long way from the power generators in the Eastern states. There are hundreds of miles of high voltage transmission lines going from the interstate inter- connector to the main SA grid.

What did AEMO recommend as a solution to the problem?

“What conclusions have come from AEMO’s investigations?
From its analysis of the Black System event, many of AEMO’s conclusions provide valuable guidancefor improving the management of extreme conditions in SA:

 Access to correct technical information about grid-connected equipment is critical for system security.

 Wind turbines successfully rode through grid disturbances. It was the action of a control setting responding to multiple disturbances that led to the Black System. Changes made to turbine control settings shortly after the event has removed the risk of recurrence given the same number of disturbances.

 Had the generation deficit not occurred, AEMO’s modelling indicates SA would have remained connected to Victoria and the Black System would have been avoided. AEMO cannot rule out the possibility that later events could have caused a black system, but is not aware of any system damage that would have done this.
 The following factors must be addressed to increase the prospects of forming a stable SA island and avoiding a Black System:
 Sufficient inertia to slow down the rate of change of frequency and enable automatic load shedding to stabilise the island system in the first few seconds. This will require increases in SA inertia under some conditions, as well as improvements to load shedding systems combined
with reduced interconnector flows under certain conditions.
 Sufficient frequency control services to stabilise frequency of the SA island system over the longer term. This will require increases in local frequency control services under some conditions.
 Sufficient system strength to control over voltages, ensure correct operation of grid protection systems, and ensure correct operation of inverter-connected facilities such as wind farms. This will require increases in local system strength under some conditions.
As noted in the recommendations chapter, AEMO is working with stakeholders to identify the best ways to address each of these requirements.
A number of factors investigated by AEMO were found to have little or no material effect on the event:
 Trips of wind turbines due to high wind speed.
 Operation of the five gas generators on-line at the time.
 Performance of the Murraylink interconnector.
 Settings of the relays that tripped the interconnector.
 Settings of powerline protection relays.
 Static Var Compensators (SVCs).” (AEMO page 7)

It can be seen that the market operator is of the view that procedures, settings, resources and techniques were and are available which would have prevented the state wide blackout, regards of the wind damage to high voltage lines and in hindsight crudely set turbine cut out settings.

The ferocity of the winds hit the grid infrastructure and the turbine settings as if they were completely impossible to predict and plan for. Of course, such wind speeds were are predictable.

Just as the 10 metre tsunami which destroyed the Fukushima diiachi primary cooling heat exchangers and back up generators were predictable on the basis of the written Japanese record. The March 2011 quake was not the largest of all time. Only a dumb a plan would put NPPs in a place like Japan. Only complete lunacy would put 55 there. Only a maniac would consider that Fast Breeder Monju would ever deliver limitless plutonium fuel for the reactors. And only a delusional twit would consider that the Japanese interim high level waste facility would be successful, economic and safe. As yet, the Japanese still cannot guarantee that no further explosions will occur when they attempt to vitrify Japanese reactor high level waste. For years it has been normal to send low level liquid nuclear waste via pipeline into the Sea of Japan. That has been going on for decades. In that context, the Fukushima liquid nuclear problem is not new. Its merely a couple of decades worth of rads destined ultimately to the sea as per normal. Though it must be said the Japanese activity levels piped into its sea is a mere fraction of the British disaster which is (was) Sellerfield aka Windscale.

Be that as it may, nuclear advocates will say that had SA a nuclear power plant at Port Augusta, as former Prime Minister John Howard wanted, then the state wide black out would not have occurred in September 2016. Probably correct. However, I have to balance that saying : yes, the high voltage cables where destroyed in two places in the SA wilderness by very high winds. Yes, the high wind speeds and the loss of sections of grid caused overly cautious trip settings in the wind turbines to trip, causing the inter state electrical inter-connector to trip out.

However, I ponder what would have happened at the theoretical Port Augusta nuclear plant when the winds blew down the high voltage power lines which connected the non existent, but hoped for by some, NPP and upon which it and all real nuclear power plants rely. For actually, all multi mega watt base load nuclear power plants rely most heavily upon a sufficiently robust and impregnable grid FOR THEIR SAFE OPERATION. And the source for that is the IAEA, to whom I will shortly turn for definitions and explanations.

But first:

2016 Caption: what if an SA nuclear power plant had relied on these broken high voltage power lines? Did the March 2011 Japanese earthquake bring down the grid upon which Fukushima Diiachi relied?

Caption: Handout photo from Tokyo Electric Power Co. shows workers attempting to repair power lines at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, March 2011. The power grid connection to Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 was destroyed during the earthquake. It took a number of days to reconnect the grid to Fukushima Diiachi. The capacity of the Emergency Core Cooling systems integral to each of the afflicted reactors is measured in hours. There were many factors involved in the accident. However, the history of meltdown studies, US Nuclear Regulations at the time of design, and the Americo-centric imaginations of ECCS designers all played a part in the disaster. However, sadly today’s current and “popular” (not) Westinghouse AP1000 reactor has a gravity fed ECCS with a time capacity which is NO DIFFERENT to that fitted to the Fukushima Diiachi reactors.

“Vibrations from the magnitude 9.0 earthquake triggered an immediate shut down of 15 of Japan’s nuclear power stations. Seismic sensors picked up the earthquake and control rods were automatically inserted into the reactors, halting the fission reaction that is used to produce electricity. This sudden loss of power across Japan’s national power grid caused widespread power failures, cutting vital electricity supplies to Fukushima Daiichi. There were three reactors, one, two and three, operating at the time when the earthquake hit while reactors four, five and six had already been shutdown as part of routine maintenance work.” “Japan earthquake: how the nuclear crisis unfolded”. Richard Gray, Science Correspondent, The Telegraph, 20 March 2011. end quote.

The IAEA requirements for electricity grids which supply Nuclear Power Plants.

The following text is a straight quote from : ” “ELECTRIC GRID RELIABILITY AND INTERFACE WITH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS” IAEA NUCLEAR ENERGY SERIES No. NG-T-3.8, IAEA, COPYRIGHT NOTICE All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised in 1972 (Paris). Reproduced here for study purposes and fair use. I have tried writing to the IAEA but they seem not to reply to normal people. Perhaps they go into shock or something.

Quote: ““The safe and economic operation of a nuclear power plant (NPP) requires the plant to be connected to an electrical grid system that has adequate capacity for exporting the power from the NPP, and for providing a reliable electrical supply to the NPP for safe startup, operation and normal or emergency shutdown of the plant.

Connection of any large new power plant to the electrical grid system in a country may require significant modification and strengthening of the grid system, but for NPPs there may be added requirements to the structure of the grid system and the way it is controlled and maintained to ensure adequate reliability.

“The organization responsible for the NPP and the organization responsible for the grid system will need to establish and agree the necessary characteristics of the grid and of the NPP, well before the NPP is built, so that they are compatible with each other. They will also need to agree the necessary modifications to the grid system, and how they are to be financed.

For a Member State that does not yet use nuclear power, the introduction and development of nuclear power is a major undertaking. It requires the country to build physical infrastructure and develop human resources so it can
construct and operate a nuclear power plant (NPP) in a safe, secure and technically sound manner.
” end quote. Source: “ELECTRIC GRID RELIABILITY AND INTERFACE WITH NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS” IAEA NUCLEAR ENERGY SERIES No. NG-T-3.8, IAEA, COPYRIGHT NOTICE All IAEA scientific and technical publications are protected by the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952 (Berne) and as revised in 1972 (Paris). Reproduced for study purpose and fair use. emphasis added. Hmm. very interesting. NPPs require a specifically designed and modified baseload capable grid network before they can be expected to safely start up, operation and shut down. Further the grid is needed, according to the world nuclear authority, for SAFE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.

Well, no wonder nuclear industry reckons baseload capable grids are mandatory. For nuclear power plants REQUIRE THEM. The nuclear sales people are a bit arse about in their mantra I think. Anyway don’t let my opinions distract you from the contents and implications of the quoted authoritative text.

So, how big a risk is the grid going down on a NPP ? Surely the Americans studied that one in depth. Let’s see what Barry Brook could have dug up about it.

I refer to the following text:
“U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION August 1988 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH Reissued to correct
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.155 Tables 1, (Task SI 5014) 5, and 6.
STATION BLACKOUT ” Operating lifetime for emergency power back up.

Source: ibid.

Quote: “The term “station blackout” refers to the complete loss of alternating current electric power to the essential and nonessential switchgear buses in a nuclear power plant. Station blackout therefore involves the loss of
offsite power concurrent with turbine trip and failure of the onsite emergency ac power system, but not the loss of available ac power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or the loss of power from “alternate ac sources.” Station blackout and alternate ac source are defined in § 50.2. Because many safety systems required for reactor core decay heat removal and containment heat removal are dependent on ac power, the consequences of a station blackout could be severe. In the event of a station blackout, the capability to cool
the reactor core would be dependent on the availability of systems that do not require ac power from the essential and nonessential switchgear buses and on the ability to restore ac power in a timely manner.

“The concern about station blackout arose because of the accumulated experience regarding the reliability of ac power supplies. Many operating plants have experienced a total loss of offsite electric power, and more occurrences
are expected in the future. In almost every one of these loss-of-offsite-power events, the onsite emergency ac power supplies have been available immediately to supply the power needed by vital safety equipment. However, in some
instances, one of the redundant emergency ac power supplies -has been unavailable. In a few cases there has been a complete loss of ac power, but during these events ac power was restored in a short time without any serious consequences.

“In addition, there have been numerous instances when emergency diesel generators have failed to start and run in response to tests conducted at operating plants.
The results of the Reactor Safety Study (Ref. 1) showed that, for one of the two plants evaluated, a station blackout event could be an important contributor to the total risk from nuclear power plant accidents. Although this total risk
was found to be small, the relative importance of station blackout events was established. This finding and the accumulated diesel generator failure experience increased the concern about station blackout.

“….References 2 through 7 provide detailed analyses of these topics. Based on risk studies performed to date, the results indicate that estimated coremelt frequencies from station blackout vary considerably for different plants
and could be a significant risk contributor for some plants.
In order to reduce this risk, action should be taken to resolve the safety concern stemming from station blackout. The issue is of concern for both PWRs and BWRs. ” end quote. Source: “U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION August 1988 REGULATORY GUIDE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH Reissued to correct REGULATORY GUIDE 1.155 Tables 1, (Task SI 5014) 5, and 6.
STATION BLACKOUT ” Operating lifetime for emergency power back up.

“Famous last words”, said the Bishop to the nuclear engineer. The workers at Fukushima Diiachi ran out of time, and it was not the workers fault. Would you buy a used NPP or even a new one when there is a possibility that grid destruction could cause another Fukushima Diiachi for any combination of reasons. Including rats chewing through power cables as they did at Fuk, repeatedly?

Here at last we have, via the US NRC, the documented link that shows, despite whatever the causes might be, were or are, there is a direct and acknowledged link between station blackout and meltdown. And meltdown is the major event which nuclear industry promised and promises would never happen, except for once in a thousand years.

ERGEN AND THE REAL CHINA SYNDROME. – the ‘forgotten’ history which underpins every Western nuclear reactor.

I refer to the official short history of the US Nuclear Commission regarding the “Emergency Core Cooling System” controversy which has underpinned every multi mega watt nuclear power station the West has constructed.

I disagree most strongly with Prof. Barry Brook in his stated position that the age of the Fukushima Diiachi nuclear power plants render any lessons learned since March 2001 irrelevant to current design reactors currently for sale, such as the Westinghouse AP1000. The lessons have been well known by nuclear authorities since the 1960s. And those lessons are vital to know. Why it is that any narrative about Fukushima Diiachi issued by nuclear authorities and repeated by nuclear supporters omit these crucial lessons and facts is totally beyond the naive and innocent lay person.

A link to the complete Ergen Report is here: https://www.academia.edu/8424123/AEC._Ergen_Report._Advisory_Task_Force_on_Power_Reactor_Emergency_Cooling._1967 It’s a very rare book, extremely hard to get, so download it and send it to your member of parliament/Congress/the Queen/Don.

Ralph Lapp’s summary of the Ergen Report, essay, New York Times, 12 DECEMBER 1971 “THOUGHTS ON NUCLEAR PLUMBING”

The following text is taken from : US Nuclear Regulatory Committee’s “A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1999” available at https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0037/ML003726170.pdf

“The Problem of Core Meltdown
The regulatory staff sought to gain as much experimental data as possible to enrich its knowledge and inform its collective engineering judgment. This was especially vital in light of the many unanswered questions about reactor behavior. The AEC had sponsored hundreds of small-scale experiments since the early 1950s that had yielded key information about a variety of reactor safety problems. But they provided little guidance on the issue of greatest concern to the AEC and the ACRS by the late 1960s–a core meltdown caused by a loss-of-coolant accident.

“Reactor experts had long recognized that a core melt was a plausible, if unlikely, occurrence. A massive loss of coolant could happen, for example, if a large pipe that fed cooling water to the core broke. If the plant’s emergency cooling system also failed, the build-up of “decay heat” (which resulted from continuing radioactive decay after the reactor shut down) could cause the core to melt. In older and smaller reactors, the experts were confident that even under the worst conditions–an accident in which the loss of coolant melted the core and it, in turn, melted through the pressure vessel that held the core–the containment structure would prevent a massive release of radioactivity to the environment. As proposed plants increased significantly in size, however, they began to worry that a core melt could lead to a breach of containment. This became their primary focus partly because of the greater decay heat the larger plants would produce and partly because nuclear vendors did not add to the size of containment buildings in corresponding proportions to the size of reactors.
The greatest source of concern about a loss-of-coolant accident in large reactors was that the molten fuel would melt through not only the pressure vessel but also through the thick layer of concrete at the foundation of the containment building. The intensely radioactive fuel would then continue on its downward path into the ground. This scenario became known as the “China syndrome,” because the melted core would presumably be heading through the earth toward China. Other possible dangers of a core meltdown were that the molten fuel would breach containment by reacting with water to cause a steam explosion or by releasing elements that could combine to cause a chemical explosion. The precise effects of a large core melt were uncertain, but it was clear that the results of spewing radioactivity into the atmosphere could be disastrous. The ACRS and the regulatory staff regarded the chances of such an accident as low; they believed that it would occur only if the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), made up of redundant equipment that would rapidly feed water into the core, failed to function properly. But they acknowledged the possibility that the ECCS might not work as designed. Without containment as a fail-safe final line of defense against any conceivable accident, they sought other means to provide safeguards against the China syndrome.

“The Emergency Core Cooling Controversy
At the prodding of the ACRS, which first sounded the alarm about the China syndrome, the AEC established a special task force to look into the problem of core melting in 1966. The committee, chaired by William K. Ergen, a reactor safety expert and former ACRS member from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, submitted its findings to the AEC in October 1967. The report offered assurances about the improbability of a core meltdown and the reliability of emergency core cooling designs, but it also acknowledged that a loss-of-coolant accident could cause a breach of containment if ECCS failed to perform. Therefore, containment could no longer be regarded as an inviolable barrier to the escape of radioactivity. This represented a milestone in the evolution of reactor regulation. In effect, it imposed a modified approach to reactor safety. Previously, the AEC had viewed the containment building as the final independent line of defense against the release of radiation; even if a serious accident took place the damage it caused would be restricted to the plant. Once it became apparent that under some circumstances the containment building might not hold, however, the key to protecting the public from a large release of radiation was to prevent accidents severe enough to threaten containment. And this depended heavily on a properly designed and functioning ECCS.

“The problem facing the AEC regulatory staff was that experimental work and experience with emergency cooling was very limited. Finding a way to test and to provide empirical support for the reliability of emergency cooling became the central concern of the AEC’s safety research program. Plans had been underway since the early 1960s to build an experimental reactor, known as the Loss-of- Fluid-Tests (LOFT) facility, at the AEC’s reactor testing station in Idaho. Its purpose was to provide data about the effects of a loss of coolant accident. For a variety of reasons, including weak management of the test program, a change of design, and reduced funding, progress on the LOFT reactor and the preliminary tests that were essential for its success were chronically delayed. Despite the complaints of the ACRS and the regulatory staff, the AEC diverted money from LOFT and other safety research projects on existing light-water reactor design to work in the development of fast- breeder reactors. A proven fast breeder was an urgent objective for the AEC and the Joint Committee; Seaborg described it as “a priority national goal” that could assure “an essentially unlimited energy supply, free from problems of fuel resources and atmospheric contamination.”
To the consternation of the AEC, experiments run at the Idaho test site in late 1970 and early 1971 suggested that the ECCS in light-water reactors might not work as designed. As a part of the preliminary experiments that were used to design the LOFT reactor, researchers ran a series of “semiscale” tests on a core that was only nine inches long (compared with l44 inches on a power reactor). The experiments were run by heating a simulated core electrically, allowing the cooling water to escape, and then injecting the emergency coolant. To the surprise of the investigators, the high steam pressure that was created in the vessel by the loss of coolant blocked the flow of water from the ECCS. Without even reaching the core, about 90 percent of the emergency coolant flowed out of the same break that had caused the loss of coolant in the first place.
In many ways the semiscale experiments were not accurate simulations of designs or conditions in power reactors. Not only the size, scale, and design but also the channels that directed the flow of coolant in the test model were markedly different than those in an actual reactor. Nevertheless, the results of the tests were disquieting. They introduced a new element of uncertainty into assessing the performance of ECCS. The outcome of the tests had not been anticipated and called into question the analytical methods used to predict what would happen in a loss-of-coolant accident. The results were hardly conclusive but their implications for the effectiveness of ECCS were troubling.
The semiscale tests caught the AEC unprepared and uncertain of how to respond. Harold Price, the director of regulation, directed a special task force he had recently formed to focus on the ECCS question and to draft a “white paper” within a month. Seaborg, for the first time, called the Office of Management and Budget to plead for more funds for safety research on light-water reactors. While waiting for the task force to finish its work, the AEC tried to keep information about the semiscale tests from getting out to the public, even to the extent of withholding information about them from the Joint Committee. The results of the tests came at a very awkward time for the AEC. It was under renewed pressure from utilities facing power shortages and from the Joint Committee to streamline the licensing process and eliminate excessive delays. At the same time, Seaborg was appealing–successfully–to President Nixon for support of the breeder reactor, and controversy over the semiscale tests and reactor safety could undermine White House backing for the program. By the spring of 1971, nuclear critics were expressing opposition to the licensing of several proposed reactors, and news of the semiscale experiments seemed likely to spur their efforts.

“For those reasons, the AEC sought to resolve the ECCS issue as promptly and quietly as possible. It wanted to settle the uncertainties about safety without arousing a public debate that could place hurdles in the way of the bandwagon market. Even before the task force that Price established completed its study of the ECCS problem, the Commission decided to publish “interim acceptance criteria” for emergency cooling systems that licensees would have to meet. It imposed a series of requirements that it believed would ensure that the ECCS in a plant would prevent a core melt after a loss-of-coolant accident. The AEC did not prescribe methods of meeting the interim criteria, but in effect, it mandated that manufacturers and utilities set an upper limit on the amount of heat generated by reactors. In some cases, this would force utilities to reduce the peak operating temperatures (and hence, the power) of their plants. Price told a press conference on June 19, 1971 that although the AEC thought it impossible “to guarantee absolute safety,” he was “confident that these criteria will assure that the emergency core cooling systems will perform adequately to protect the temperature of the core from getting out of hand.”
The interim ECCS criteria failed to achieve the AEC’s objectives. News about the semiscale experiments triggered complaints about the AEC’s handling of the issue even from friendly observers. It also prompted calls from nuclear critics for a licensing moratorium and a shutdown of the eleven plants then operating.

“Criticism expressed by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), an organization established in 1969 to protest misuse of technology that had recently turned its attention to nuclear power, received wide publicity. The UCS took a considerably less sanguine view of ECCS reliability than that of the AEC. It sharply questioned the adequacy of the interim criteria, charging, among other things, that they were “operationally vague and meaningless.” Scientists at the AEC’s national laboratories, without endorsing the alarmist language that the UCS used, shared some of the same reservations. As a result of the uncertainties about ECCS and the interim criteria, the AEC decided to hold public hearings that it hoped would help resolve the technical issues. It wanted to prevent the ECCS question from becoming a major impediment to the licensing of individual plants. The AEC insisted that its critics had exaggerated the severity of the ECCS problem. The regulatory staff viewed the results of the failed semiscale tests as serious but believed that the technical issues the experiments raised would be resolved within a short time. It did not regard the tests as indications that existing designs were fundamentally flawed and it emphasized the conservative engineering judgment it applied in evaluating plant applications. But the ECCS controversy damaged the AEC’s credibility and played into the hands of its critics. Instead of frankly acknowledging the potential significance of the ECCS problem and taking time to fully evaluate the technical uncertainties, the AEC acted hastily to prevent the issue from undermining public confidence in reactor safety or causing licensing delays. This gave credence to the allegations of its critics that it was so determined to promote nuclear power and develop the breeder reactor that it was inattentive to safety concerns.” End quote Source: US NRC as above.

The outcome of the Ergen Report and the famous Controversy surrounding the adequacy of Emergency Core Cooling Systems as an US nuclear regulation called “Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors”, which is available to read here: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0046.html Such was the controversy that the US nuclear industry was unable to construct any new NPPs until public hearings had taken place. The construction of new NPPs recommenced upon the issuance of safety and adequacy by nuclear authorities. At the time and since, both experts and the general public, in large numbers remain skeptical of official assurances. The general knowledge of the controversy, for it was very great one, is well remembered by many Americans. Not many Australians today are aware of the limitations in practice of both old and new ECCS systems.

Salient extracts from the Acceptance Criteria for “Emergency Core Cooling Systems…” follow:

“50.46 Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors….

“(b)(1) Peak cladding temperature. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall not exceed 2200° F.
(2) Maximum cladding oxidation. The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shall nowhere exceed 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation. As used in this subparagraph total oxidation means the total thickness of cladding metal that would be locally converted to oxide if all the oxygen absorbed by and reacted with the cladding locally were converted to stoichiometric zirconium dioxide. If cladding rupture is calculated to occur, the inside surfaces of the cladding shall be included in the oxidation, beginning at the calculated time of rupture…..

“(3) Maximum hydrogen generation. The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the chemical reaction of the cladding with water or steam shall not exceed 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react.
(4) Coolable geometry. Calculated changes in core geometry shall be such that the core remains amenable to cooling.
(5) Long-term cooling. After any calculated successful initial operation of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.”
end quote.

As the Fukushima nuclear disaster unfolded, reactor after reactor exploded. “Nuclear experts” providing narrative to Australian media outlets described these explosions as being “perfectly normal”, “consisting of merely Hydrogen gas/”

No such expert fully explained that the mass produced reactor explosions were vivid demonstrations of the fact that ECCS as designed and regulated by the USA, being imposed upon the design of the US originated Fukushima reactors, were patently inadequate. That the rules merely stated a criteria which was known to be impossible to achieve in the real world in the event of the ECCS actually be called upon to work.

Criteria sub paragraph (5) is most troubling. It calls for the ECCS to contiue to work for months: “Long-term cooling. After any calculated successful initial operation of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.

Yet we learn from the American Nuclear Society that the US designed (incorporating a claimed conforming with the US Design Criteria above) to operate not for the length of time the longest lived radioctivity remaining in the core demanded, (months) but EIGHT HOURS.

Did the tsunami damage the “emergency cooling water” as Prof Brook claims?

From my reading of qualified texts, I conclude the answer to be NO. I refer to :

‘SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUES RAISED BY THE
FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT AND IMPROVEMENTS
SUGGESTED
JIN HO SONG* and TAE WOON KIM
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
1045 Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Korea, 305-353
*
Corresponding author. E-mail : dosa@kaeri.re.kr
Received August 22, 2013
Accepted for Publication November 05, 2013″, at https://ac.els-cdn.com/S1738573315301649/1-s2.0-S1738573315301649-main.pdf?_tid=d8f804c0-7412-4fec-b2bb-b6422f537085&acdnat=1530402801_a1089807f49ab4ae98ba6bf79ee9a247

I refer also to:

“FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI: ANS Committee Report, A Report by The American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima March 2012. Dale Klein Co-Chairman Michael Corradini Co-Chairman ANS Special Committee on Fukushima ANS Special Committee on Fukushima at http://hps.org/documents/ANSFukushimaReport.pdf

I further refer to the text: ““Measures Taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (December 2011 Edition)”, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111222e18.pdf

Prof. Brook has, since the accident at Fukushima occurred, made numerous and glaring technical errors in his bombastic and simplistic/ignorant statements about the progression and outcomes of the Fukushima Diiachi accident. This is just another one. His passing reference to the Emergency Core Cooling system in his ABC One Plus One interview consists of this:

” And the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it.” Brook, B., ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, 18 March 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo

At no stage does any of the above Fukushima Diiachi accident chronologies report that “..the emergency cooling water as well was also damaged such that they ended up having to use sea water to cool it.” (Brook, 18 March 2011) However, Brook appears to be confusing tanks of fresh water located around the plant site as a fire fighting resource. These tanks of fresh water are NOT part of the emergency core cooling system. BUT the decision was taken, based upon prior Japanese experience with difficulties cooling reactors during a 2007 earthquake. At that time the Japanese authorities devised a means by which reactor pressure vessel coolant could be maintained by use of fire engines and hose lines which tapped into the reactors emergency core cooling system. The source for this is TEPCO, as discussed fully below.

The Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster appears to be the SECOND TIME that Japanese reactors demonstrated the lackings inherent in the design of the Emergency core cooling systems.

It was long planned to use seawater as coolant as coolant mixed with Boron in the case of cooling failure.

Far from demonstrating the resilience of the plant as Brook implies, reality shows, and the technical show, that the reactors suffered fatal core melts and that pressure vessel and containment failure did in fact occur at Fukushima Diiachi. The ECCS remained intact in all reactors and was not damaged by the tsunami.

What events do these QUALIFIED SOURCES say caused the use of sea water to prevent further core melt down? Let’s see:

” In parallel with ongoing freshwater injections, the fire brigade started to prepare for seawater injection as instructed by the Site Superintendent. This was due to the limited freshwater reserved for the fire protection tanks. “ Source: ““Measures Taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (December 2011 Edition)”, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp- com/release/betu11_e/images/111222e18.pdf Page 48.

“At 15:27, the first tsunami struck, followed at 15:35 by the second tsunami…..Subsequently, the Main Control Room informed the
Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters that seawater had reached the <em>entrance of the service building. ” “The operators in the Main Control Room realized that tsunamis were
flooding the site. “Saturday, March 12, 2011 0:06 There was a possibility of the drywell (hereafter the “D/W”) pressure
exceeding 600kPa abs, which could require venting of the Primary
Containment Vessel (hereafter “Vent/Venting”). Thus, the Site
Superintendent ordered to prepare for Venting….0:30 It was confirmed that the government’s measure to evacuate local residents had been completed (evacuation of local residents staying in Futaba-machi” “0:49 Possibility of the D/W pressure exceeding 600kPa abs exists, so a specified event
(abnormal rise in containment vessel pressure) in accordance with stipulations of
Article 15, Clause 1 of the Nuclear Emergency Act was determined to have
occurred, government and other authorities were notified at 0:55. ..” 1:30 (Approx.) Proposal to vent Units 1 and 2 made to the Prime Minister, Minister of Economy,Trade and Industry, and Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and consent obtained. 1:48 It was confirmed that the diesel fire pump had been stopped. 2:03 Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters started studying a method whereby a fire engine would be connected to the water supply pipe inlet of the Fire Protection System line. ” “2:47 Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters reported to the competent
government and other authorities at 2:30 that the D/W pressure had risen to
840kPa abs.
3:06 Press release on Vent operation
4:00 (Approx.) Freshwater injection into the reactors started from the fire engine through the Fire Protection System. Injection of 1,300 liters completed. ” “4:01 The result of assessing radiation exposure in the event of operating Venting was reported to the competent government departments and agencies.
4:55 It was confirmed that radiation dose in the Power Station site had risen (Near the main gate: 0.069μSv/h (4:00) → 0.59μSv/h (4:23)). The rise was reported to the competent government departments and agencies.
5:14 The radiation dose in the Power Station site was rising, while the D/W pressure was on the decline. Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters decided that an “outside leak of radioactive materials” had occurred and accordingly reported the event to the competent government departments and agencies.”
“5:44 The Prime Minister issued an evacuation order to local residents staying in the
areas within a 10-km radius of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
5:46 A fire engine resumed freshwater injection into the reactors through the Fire
Protection System.
5:52 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through
the Fire Protection System line.
6:30 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through the Fire Protection System line.
6:33 It was confirmed that a study was underway to evacuate residents of
Okuma-machi into Miyakoji areas.” “6:50 The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry ordered Venting operation
(manual Vent) in accordance with law.
7:11 The Prime Minister arrived at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
7:55 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through
the Fire Protection System line.
8:03 The Site Superintendent instructed operators to manipulate Vent at 9:00.
8:04 The Prime Minister left Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
8:15 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through the Fire Protection System line.” “8:27 It was confirmed that part of the residents of Okuma-machi had not completed
evacuation.
8:30 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through
the Fire Protection System line.
8:37 Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters informed Fukushima Prefecture
Office of its preparation to start venting around 9:00. The headquarters made an
adjustment that it will vent after confirming the situation of evacuation.
9:02 It was confirmed that residents of Okuma-machi (part of Kuma district) had completed evacuation. 9:04 Operators headed for the work site to Vent. ” “9:15 The fire engine completed 1,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through
the Fire Protection System line.
9:15 (Approx.) The vent valve (MO valve) of the Primary Containment Vessel (hereafter the
“PCV”) opened manually.
9:30 (Approx.) Operators tried manipulating the small valve of the vent valve (AO valve) of the Suppression Chamber (hereafter the “S/C”). However, they had to give up the efforts because of high radiation dose.
9:40 The fire engine completed 15,000 liter freshwater injection into the reactor through the Fire Protection System line.
9:53 Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters again reported to the competent government departments and agencies the result of its dosage assessment in the event that Vent was operated. “10:40 Since the surrounding of the main gate and monitoring post No. 8 indicated a
higher radiation dose, it was judged that the rise would be highly attributable to the Vent operation that had led to emission of radioactive materials. 11:15 Radiation dose is falling, thus indicating that venting was not likely sufficiently effective.
11:39 Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters reported to the competent
government departments and agencies that one of the employees who had entered the reactor building for Vent operation had an exposed dosage beyond 100mSv (106.30 mSv).
14:30 When the restoration team installed a temporary air compressor around 14:00 to operate the large valve of vent valve (AO valve) of the S/C, the team identified a decline in the D/W, decided that the decline was attributed to “emission of radioactive materials,” and reported the event to the government and other authorities at 15:18.” “14:53 The fire engine completed approx. 80,000 liter freshwater injection into the
reactor (in total of accumulation).
14:54 The Site Superintendent ordered operators to inject seawater in the reactor.
15:18 The restoration team was advancing the restoration of the standby liquid control system. The team planned to perform injection into the reactor by starting up the pump of the standby liquid control system as soon as it is ready. Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters also informed the competent government departments and agencies of its plan that the seawater would be injected in the reactor through the Fire Protection System when the preparation is completed.
15:30 (Approx.) The restoration team formed a route where electricity from an HVPS car is supplied to the Unit 1 MCC through the Unit 2 P/C. The team started supplying electricity up to a point just before the standby liquid control system.
15:36 An explosion occurred at the reactor building.
16:27 Surrounding of monitoring post No. 4 measured a radiation dose beyond 500μSv/h (1,015μSv/h). …” “18:25 The Prime Minister issued an evacuation order to local residents staying in
areas within a 20-km radius of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
18:30 (Approx.) The results of checking the state of the fire engine, buildings, etc. confirmed that
these areas were in a mess. Damage was also identified to the power supply
facility for the standby liquid control system and to the seawater injection
hose that had been reserved. They were confirmed as unworkable.
19:04 The fire engine started seawater injection into the reactor through the Fire
Protection System line.
20:45 Seawater was injected in the reactor after being mixed with boric acid. ”
Source: ““Measures Taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (December 2011 Edition)”, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111222e18.pdf

It is important the following fact about the Fukushima Diiachi reactors ECCS systems. The modification procedure was a Lesson Learned from the 2007 Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, as follows:

“Activities after “17:12 on March 11 when the Site Superintendent ordered that an alternative means of water injection be studied as part of accident management (hereafter “AM”) measures and a method for injecting water into the reactor using fire engines (installed on a lesson from the “Chuetsu-oki Earthquake”)”
・ At 17:12 on March 11, the Emergency Countermeasures Headquarters started studying an alternative means of water injection (the Fire Protection System (hereafter the “FP”), replacement water condensate system, and containment cooling system) set up as part of the AM measures, and on the use of fire engines.
・ Operators at the Main Control Room removed the AM operation procedure
description, applied the shift supervisor seat to check alternative means of water injection into the reactor and confirmed alternative lines of water injection. At 18:35 on March 11, the operation room used the DDFP to form an alternative line of water injection into the reactor through the Core Spray System (hereafter the“CS”) from the FP line. Since no power supply was available, the Main Control Room had no control over the line. A total of five members, consisting of four operators and one member of the power generation team, wore full-face masks and
headed for the Reactor Building. With the help of flashlights, the members reached the Reactor Building where they manually opened five motor valves, including the CS, and at around 20:30, completed the formation of an alternative line of water injection into the reactor. ” Source: “Measures Taken at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (December 2011 Edition)”, TEPCO, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111222e18.pdf

So we can see that the objections raised by scientists and technicians in response to the risk of core melt in large reactors first voiced in the late 1960s (Ergen, AEC), early 1970s (Lapp, AEC), and Nader and Abbott (1975) and the US Supreme Court (1975) – that being, the inability to insert water via ECCS into a reactor pressure vessel suffering over pressure due to over heating was confirmed in Japan. In 2007 they evolved a plan whereby, according to the quote from TEPCO above, external water (water in addition to the ECCS reserves) could be injected into the reactors directly from external fire pumps after over pressure had been released from the pressure vessels. And this TEPCO report is the only one I have found with reference to this technique. It is apparently uniquely Japanese. I cannot find a discussion of the impact of the 2007 quake on Japanese reactors anywhere on the internet so far. However it seems that the inability of ECCS as predicted specifically by Nader and Abbott in 1975 and foreshadowed by Ergen and Lapp earlier has been experienced and worried about in Japan since 2007.

The fact is, from 1975 until 2011 the promise of the nuclear industry was that the ECCS systems integral to GE MK1 and Mk2 and Mk3 reactors was sufficient to prevent core melt and pressure over pressure, sufficient to prevent any venting of radioactive material to the environment. As anyone with any knowledge of the technical reports which under pin the design and relevant regulations relating to these reactors knows, the industry made this false promise and maintained it for decades in the teeth of constant disagreement from independent technical experts. The aware world, including millions of Americans who were awake in from the time of Ergen Report on, had been waiting for a test of the honesty of the nuclear industry. When the day came that tested the claims for the ECCS, the ECCS systems of three reactors all failed to prevent core melt and fission product venting on the same day at the same place. Despite dire warnings not to place more than one reactor on each reactor site. These are not lessons learned actually, they are lies revealed.

THE TEPCO REPORT ABOVE REFUTES THE CLAIM OF PROF. BARRY BROOK. THEY USED SEA WATER AS THE COOLING WATER WAS LEAKING OUT AS FAST IT WAS BEING PUMPED IN. THEY HAD CONSUMED ALL OF THE AVAILABLE FRESH WATER. THE STOCKS WERE LIMITED FROM THE START. THE ECCS SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE COOLANT THEY CONTAINED, INTEGRAL TO EACH REACTOR, COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY THE TSUNAMI UNLESS THE REACTORS THEMSELVES WERE DAMAGED BY THE TSUNAMI. THE REACTOR BUILDINGS AND PRESSURE VESSELS WERE NOT DAMAGED BY THE TSUNAMI.

The American Nuclear Society describes the multi system Emergency Core Cooling Systems integral to each afflicted reactor at Fukushima Diiachi as follows:

“In the event that the normal heat-removal pathway to the
main turbine/condenser is lost, BWRs have, as the first
backup, systems to provide core safety by either adding
water to the RPV or by an alternate heat removal path, or by
both. BWR/3s have isolation condenser systems that both
remove the decay heat by condensing the generated steam in
the RPV through heat exchange with a water pool outside
the drywell and return condensate to the reactor over a wide
range of reactor pressures. No additional water is added,
however, so if there are leaks in the primary pressure circuit,
additional water is required from other sources. BWR/4s
and BWR/5s use an RCIC system, which is a turbine-driven
pump using reactor steam that can add water to the RPV
over a wide range of reactor pressures. The RCIC system
draws water from either a large pool inside the containment,
the suppression pool, or from a tank located outside the
containment, the condensate storage tank (CST). The RCIC
system has the advantage that it can provide significantly
more water than needed to make up for decay heat–generated
steam, but it does not remove the heat. When the
reactor becomes isolated from the main turbine/condenser,
that heat is transported to the suppression pool via safety
and relief valves (SRVs) that open and close to maintain the
primary system pressure within safety limits. There is sufficient
heat capacity in the suppression pool for many hours
of decay heat storage before the heat must be removed from
the containment using pumps and heat exchangers requiring
electrical power. If this does not occur, the pressure and
temperature in the containment will rise as time progresses.

“If these first backup systems are not sufficient, then ECCSs
are provided to both add water to the RPV and to remove
decay heat either from the RPV or from the containment.
With one exception, all these systems require alternating-current
(AC) power that is supplied either by the NPP normal
AC distribution system or by emergency diesel generators
(EDGs) if the normal supply is lost. The exception is that
as part of the ECCSs in BWR/3s and BWR/4s, there is
a high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system that is a
turbine-driven pump that uses reactor steam and that has
about seven times the capacity of the RCIC system and can
add water over a wide range of reactor pressures.

As we discuss below, because for many hours the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power station (NPS)2 was without electricalpower and long-term cooling to remove the decay heat to the
environment, the aforementioned systems were not available
to keep the reactor core from overheating and the fuel from
being damaged.”
source: FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI:
ANS Committee Report AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY A Report by The American Nuclear Society Special Committee on Fukushima 12 March 2012.

Here, the worst fears regarding the inadequacy of the Emergency Core Cooling System capability held since the publication of the Ergen Report (AEC) of 1969, Lapp’s (AEC) public essay “Thoughts on Nuclear Plumbing” (NYT) of 1971 and “The Menace of Atomic Energy” by Nader and Abbott, Outback Press, Victoria, Australia. Copyright 1977. ISBN 0 86888 0515. (some pages from the book are available here for study purposes: https://nuclearhistory.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/the-eccs-controversey-of-the-1960s-and-1970s-usa-in-the-light-of-march-2011/

Given that the time from 1969 until 2011 amounts to FORTY TWO YEARS, and given the nuclear industry’s denial of the veracity of these sources extends for that WHOLE PERIOD OF TIME , I am left aghast and horrified by the Brook claim that:

“Prof Brooke: “I think it’s clear that the risk that the tsunami faced and the fact that all of the redundant generators were wiped out in one blow suggests that there was not enough prudent forethought for that risk. And in any sort of major accident in any industry there’s a period of introspection afterwards. Looking at what went wrong. Just like in anything in our lives. And trying to take the salient lessons and use that in future is a …I see the announcements of governments around the world to re-look at the safety of their current nuclear power plants. That’s an eminently sensible thing to do because you can look at all of the contingencies that they have allowed for and say well, what if the situation in Japan had happened to us, are we prepared? That’s learning from the lessons of history.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFs_-8DtZvo ABC TV One Plus One: Barry Brook on nuclear power’s future after Fukushima, posted Published on 18 Mar 2011

Oh frigging bullshit Barry!!! How many years will take for the nuclear industry to actually READ AND COMPREHEND Ergen, Lapp and Nader and Abbott you dim wit?!!!!

THE FREAKING LESSONS WERE LEARNED BY EVERYONE EXCEPT THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY FROM 1969 TO 1977!!! Learning from the lessons of history indeed. Learning at the time WITHIN the industry should have occurred when the knowledge first became available – from 1969 to 1977!!! Why wait until 2018? Since 2011 all the industry has done is fudge and mislead on the issues raised by the PREDICTED performance of the GE ECCS.

Half the world’s population knew the issues even as the supposed learned voice overs of the TV news footage from Fuk in 2011 mumbled “This is perfectly normal….” as the zirconium overheated, produced hydrogen, bending fuel rods, venting liquified cesium etc, causing explosions, rupturing the pressure vessel top flanges, causing release of nuclides into air, melting control rod seals at the base of the reactors, allowing molten fuel to drip down onto concrete and below….. ALL OF THIS WAS FORESEEN FORTY FREAKING YEARS BROOK!! IF THERE IS A LESSON FROM HISTORY HERE, SPORT, it is that the INDUSTRY IS ARROGANT, NEGLIGENT AND IGNORED THAT WHICH WAS KNOWN TO BE TRUE FROM 1969 ON.!!!!!!

BROOK, IMO YOU ARE APPALLING!!!! YOU ARE A MERE LAYMAN LIKE ME IN THIS MATTER. YOU HAVE ZERO QUALS IN THIS!!!

Photo: The black board in the Fukushima Diiachi control room : “16.36 hours, ECCS failure” Dan Edge, BBC, Quicksilver productions, PBS, “Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown”, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/japans-nuclear-meltdown/ video, transcript: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/transcript-4/ to quote: Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown WRITTEN, PRODUCED AND DIRECTED BY Dan Edge
Quote:
“March 11, 2011
Day 1
………

NARRATOR:This is the frantically scribbled log the engineers kept on a whiteboard in the control room as the nuclear plant slid towards disaster. “15:42, nuclear emergency declared. 15:50, loss of water level readings. 16:36, emergency core cooling system malfunction. No water can be injected.” end quote.” Source: Dan Edge, BBC, Quicksliver Products PBS, “Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown”

Further:

Who knew this would happen prior to and at the approval and licencing of the design in the USA? Consulting Nader and Abbott we can build a list of those who knew. There are two groups – independent scientists and technologists who were dissenters and the nuclear authorities themselves, as follows:

Henry Kandall and Daniel Ford. (Union of Concerned Scientists)
Dr Morris Rosen (Atomic Energy Commission)
George Brockett (AEC)
J. Curtis Haire (AEC)
Milton Shaw (AEC)
Dr Alvin M. Weinberg (Oak Ridge)
The Federal Republic of Germany Reactor Safety Committee, 1972.
The Federation of American Scientists, 1973.
The RAND Corporation, 1972 (CIA)
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 1972 (AEC)
The California Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Science and Technology 1973
Swedish government scientific opinion of US reactor design safety – ECCS
Pugwash Conference 1973
2,300 US scientists – petition to Congress. 1975.

How did they know? The knowledge was gained during tests of the ECCS commissioned by the ECCS as documented by Nader and Abbott:

Nader and Abbot, The Menace of Atomic Power, 1977, page 101.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30026010