Blatant Lies within the Nuclear ECCS Regulations and Practice

“As with Unit 1, a scram occurred, and the MSIVs were closed after the earthquake. The RCIC system was manually started a couple of times and automatically tripped because of a high water level in the RPV. After the tsunami, some DC power was also lost, just as in Unit 1; therefore, the HPCI system was lost. However, the RCIC system operated for ~70 hours. In general, one should not expect the RCIC system to run much beyond 8 hours in a station blackout (SBO). http://fukushima.ans.org/report/accident-analysis American Society Nuclear Society report. Admits components of the ECCS sub systems (RCIC) are designed to last 8 hours only.”

True. design life 8 hours for RCIC of ECCS.

Regulatory requirement for whole of ECCS:

http://www.nrc.gov/…/doc…/cfr/part050/part050-0046.html

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

50.46 Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors ……http://www.nrc.gov/…/doc…/cfr/part050/part050-0046.html “(5) Long-term cooling. After any calculated successful initial operation of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.”

end quote. EIGHT HOURS DESIGNED LIFE IS A BREACH OF THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA.

These design requirements were issued as a result of the Ergen Report into Emergency Core Cooling Systems (AEC, 1967) and these requirements were known PRIOR TO THE START OF WORK OF FUKUSHIMA DIIACHI REACTOR NUMBER ONE IN THAT SAME YEAR. THIS UNIT WAS BUILT BY GE, A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE ERGEN REPORT.

THEY KNEW THE REGS, AND INSTEAD OF DESIGNING AN ECCS SYSTEM THAT WORKED FOR MONTHS OR FOR ‘AS LONG AS REQUIRED”, IT WAS DESIGNED TO LAST A MERE EIGHT HOURS. AND THAT IS STILL THE CASE.

ANY REACTOR WITH ECCS NOT DESIGNED FOR ‘AS LONG AS NEEDED” BREACHES THE REGS.

These facts show that the design and the regs are mere PR.

How dare the nuclear industry, in Japan or anywhere else, blame a dead man, a brave man, Mr Yoshida, for the disaster at Fukushima Diiachi!!

Why wasnt he trained in ECCS? If he was he would have surely seen what Ralph Lapp saw in 1971. That reactors are unsafe and should be located away from people.

And that, as history reveals, is why Fukushima Diiachi is located in the midst of Japan’s food bowl.

Even so, it nearly took out Tokyo.

NEW YORK TIMES 12 DECEMBER 1971

THOUGHTS ON NUCLEAR PLUMBING

LAPP

LAPP

LAPP

LAPP

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